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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the structural problems faced by
the Savings and Loan Industry and the reforms developed by
the regulatory agencies, and Congress to address these
problems.
In Part I, the Industry's exposure to interest rate
risk given their current structure is analyzed and their
volatile performance given changes in economic and
regulatory conditions is demonstrated. It is concluded
from this investigation that the current structure of the
Industry is clearly unsuited for present and future
economic and regulatory conditions.
In Part II, the innovations and reforms granted to
the Industry by Congress, and the regulatory agencies is
evaluated, in light of the help they provide the Industry
to cope with a more volatile financial environment.
This thesis concludes that the Industry has been
given the capability to effectively deal with the economic
and regulatory conditions that have currently produced
their dismal state, but that it may not be able to survive
these current economic and regulatory conditions, during
the period required to make the transition to a new
structure, without additional assistance.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Lynne B. Sagalyn
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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9Introduction:
The Savings and Loan Industry is in the throes of
its worst crisis since the Great Depression. One only
has to read the titles of recent articles about the
state of the Industry from the Wall Street Journal to
get a flavor for the Industry's current problems: November
20, 1980: "Thrifts Earning Outlook is Undermined by
Recent Run-up in Interest Rates," February 20, 1981:
"Interest Rates Squeeze Savings Institutions and Their
Insures Too," March 20, 1981: "Regulators Seek to Ease
Anxieties Over Dismal State of S&L Industry," May 21, 1981:
"Bill to Aid Sick S&Ls Could Eventually Lead to Inter-
state Banking."
In 1980, the Industry suffered its worst earnings
year in its history and the first half of 1981 promises
to be even worse - with the Industry suffering overall
losses. For some Savings and Loans, losses have become
so severe they are unable to meet government net worth
requirements, and for a few, heavy losses have drained
all their net worth, requiring immediate government
assistance. The increase in the number of S&L defaults
in early 1981 has severely tested the ability of
Government agencies to keep the Industry afloat. Richard
Pratt, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
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testifying before the Senate Banking Committee in April
1981, acknowledged that the amount of the FSLIC's spending
this year "could have an unsettling effect upon the
public confidence in the insurance fund... We are at the
point where truly significant increments of assistance
must come from Congress." 1
The Industry's current dismal state correlates
directly with recent changes in the economic and regulatory
environment which has laid bare the immense structural
problems facing the industry. In a nutshell the Industry's
current problems, noted above, stem from their holdings
of a mortgage portfolio whose yields in the present
economic and regulatory climate are increasingly being
overtaken by the cost of the liabilities they use to
fund these assets.
How and why the Industry got into this unfortunate
situation, and just how serious their problems are
today, is the subject of Part I of this thesis. In this
part, great pains are taken to isolate the structure
of the Savings and Loan Industry and demonstrate how
both economic and regulatory changes affect Savings and
Loan performance. Development of this framework in
1As quoted in G. Christian Hill, "Bill to Aid Sick S&Ls
Could Eventually Lead to Interstate Banking," Wall Street
Journal May 21, 1981.
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Chapter 1 and 2 provides the basis for an analysis of
current economic and regulatory conditions in Chapter 3
and an understanding of the need for structural change
in the Industry.
Part II will primarily focus on the long-term
solutions developed by Congress and the regulatory
agencies designed to help the Industry adapt to the new
economic and regulatory conditions. Specifically the
following questions will be addressed in Part II:
1) Do these reforms give the Savings and Loan Industry
the capability to effectively deal with the economic
and regulatory conditions that have currently produced
their dismal state? 2) If so, what strategic options
are available for Savings and Loan's to succeed?
Finally, what are the implications of these reforms for
the Savings and Loan Industry and housing finance?
It is in the last chapter where the present
problems of the Industry will'again be discussed and the
need for emergency assistance addressed. Given the current
economic and regulatory environment, it is indeed possible
that the seriousness of the Industry's present problems
may preclude the opportunities created for their structural
reform and a viable future, unless outside assistance is
p2rovided to bolster the Industry, until they are better
ecuipped to adapt to the new financial environment.
12
PART I
THE THRIFT PROBLEM AND THE
NEED FOR REFORM
13
CHAPTER I
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
AND THEIR SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INTEREST RATE RISK
The Savings and Loan industry, more than any other
of our nation's privately owned financial intermediaries
is largely a product of government design. As
organizations chartered by either the states or the
federal government, they have been endowed with the
express public purpose of promoting thrift and home-
ownership.
The Homeowners Loan Act of 1933, which authorizes
the federal chartering of Savings and Loan Associations
(S&Ls) and serves as a model for many state charters,
carefully circumscribes Savings and Loan Association
activities. Although many of the original provisions
of the act restricting the type of assets and liabilities
federally chartered savings and loans could hold as of
December 31, 1980 have either been amended or repealed
with the passage of the Depository Institutions De-
regulation and Monetary Control Act in March of 1980,
the act's original provisions have largely determined
14
the present structure of the industry. 2
On the asset side, to assure their role as home
financers, the act greatly restricted (or prohibited)
federally chartered savings and loans from making nearly
all types of loans (e.g. business, consumer, construction,
equity) except mortgage loans and to ensure local
orientation of mortgage lending these could be only of
a limited size and be made only in a limited geographic
3
area.
On the liability side, to assure their role as
household depository institutions, the act prohibited
Savings and Loans from: issuing demand deposits,
maintaining corporate accounts, issuing capital stocks;
and discouraged Savings and Loans from borrowing from
other than the federal home loan banks. 4
Because of the extreme specificity of these
regulations, whether one looks at Savings and Loan
balance sheets at the end of 1960, 1970 or 1980 their
2The specialized asset structures of the nation's S&Ls
have been also reinforced by federal tax laws. In order to
qualify for favorable tax treatment using the bad debt
allowance, S&Ls have been required to maintain 82 percent
of their assets in specified items made up predominately
of mortgage loans. See Kenneth Biederman and John Tuccillo
Taxation and Regulation of the Savings and Loan Industry,
(New York: Lexington Books, 1976).
3Title 12, United States Code Sec. 1464, 1976 Edition
(since updated).
4 Ibid.
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structure is largely the same. (Table 1) Household
deposits, accounting for over 80 percent of Savings and
Loan liabilities is their primary source of funds, and
home mortgages accounting for more than 80 percent of
Savings and Loan assets is their primary use of funds.
Because of their structure and their size, (there
are over 4,600 Savings and Loan Associations with assets
totalling over $618.3 billion dollars as of December 31,
1980), they are the nation's most important home
finance institution and its second largest depository
institution. Since reaching maturity around 1965, the
industry has traditionally held approximately 45 percent
of all one to four family home loans outstanding compared
to the next largest holder, commercial banks 16 percent
share; (Table 2) and their deposit portfolios have since
1960 accounted for over 35 percent of all over the
counter savings compared to commercial bank's share of
over 40 percent. (Table 3)
The Nature of Savings and Loan Mortgages and Deposits
The residential mortgage assets of the nation's
Savings and Loans are concentrated in long-term, fixed-
rate instruments. Short-term construction loans made
up only 4 percent of Savings and Loan assets in 1980.
And, although variable rate mortgages accounted for as
much as three-fifths of the residential mortgage assets
16
Table 1
Balance Sheet Composition of
Savings and Loan Associations
1960, 1970, 1980
(in percent)
Assets:
Mortgage Loans and
Mortgage Backed Securities
Liauid Assets
Nonmortgage Consumer Loans
Other Assets
Liabilities
Savings Deposits
FHLB Advances
Other Borrowed Money
Loans in Process
All other Liabilities
1960
84.0
10.2
5.8
100
87.0
3.0
3.0
Net Worth 7.0 6.8 5.2
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: United States League or Savings Associations,
Savings and Loan Factbooks, 1961, 1971.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Federal Home Loan
Bank Board News, February 1981.
1970
85.3
3.8
1.1
4.8
100
33.1
5.9
0.3
1.7
2.1
1980
34.2
9.1
1.9
4.3
100
81.1
7.6
2.8
1.4
1.9
Table 2
Percentage of Total Home Mortgages Held
by Different Institutions and Individuals
1950 - 1980
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Holder
Savings and
Loan Assoc-
iations 29.0 34.0 39.0 42.7 41.8 45.6 47.0 47.3 46.8 45.2 39.6
Commercial
Banks 21.1 17.1 13.6 13.8 14.2 15.7 15.5 16.0 16.7 16.7 25.0
Mutual Savings
Banks 9.5 13.4 14.5 15.3 14.2 10.2 9.5 8.8 8.2 7.4 6.3
Life Insurance
Companies 18.8 20.0 17.5 13.4 9.0 3.6 2.9 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8
Sponsored Credit
Agenices 3.2 3.4 5.0 3.0 8.3 13.8 14.4 15.1 16.1 4.1 17.0
Other
Institutions 1.7 2.5 3.2 4.6 4.7 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.8 14.9 2.8
Households 16.8 9.6 7.2 7.4 7.8 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governorq nf the Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, 1949-1978, and Flow of
Funds Accounts 4th Quarter 1980.
Type of
--_
Table 3
Percentage of Over the Counter
Savings Held by Depository Institutions
1950 - 1979
Type of 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Holder
Savings and
Loan Assoc-
iations 1 19.3 29.0 36.3 36.4 33.3 34.8 36.0 36.9 36.8 37.5
Mutual Savings
Banks 2 27.5 25.5 21.2 17.3 16.3 13.4 13.2 12.8 12.2 11.7
Commercial
Banks 3 48.0 41.6 39.2 43.2 46.9 47.9 46.6 45.9 46.4 46.3
Credit
Unions 4 1.2 2.2 2.9 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.2 4.5 4.8 4.5
Postal
Savings 4.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 - - - --
TOTALS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1 All types of savings
2 Regular and special savings accounts
3 Time and savings deposits of individuals, partnerships and corporations
4 Shares and member deposits
Source: U.S. League of Savings Associations, Savings and Loan Factbook '80.
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of some of the large California Savings and Loan
Associations they made up less than 5 percent of
aggregated Savings and Loan mortgage portfolios.5
This emphasis on the long term fully amortized
fixed rate mortgage arose out of the competition created
by government entry into the mortgage market during the
depression.6 Prior to that time homes were normally
financed by homeowners through the acquisition of
several small short term unamortized loans that had to
be renegotiated every four or five years. Beginning in
1934, however, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
developed a low downpayment, long-term fully amortized
fixed rate mortgage that became the model of the
industry.
In 1980, the average Savings and Loan Association
mortgage of $51,900 covered 75.4 percent of the
purchase price and had a maturity of 27.2 years. Most
mortgages written, however, because of prepayments do not
5Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Statement of Condition for
FDIC Insured Savings and Loan Associations, Semi-Annual
Aggregates, December 31, 1980.
6Dwight Jaffee, "Innovations in the Mortgage Market" in
Conference on Financial Innovation, William- Silber, ed.
(New York: Lexington Books, 1977) p. 100.
7Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal, March 1980,
p. 60.
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remain outstanding until maturity. The average Savings
and Loan Association mortgage remains on the books for
between 7-10 years. And because of amortized principal
repayments, the mortgage portfolio of your average
Savings and Loan Association will turnover at a rate
of 15.3 percent per year or once every 6.54 years.8
Although the composition of Savings and Loan
deposits have changed a great deal over time, in
contrast to Savings and Loan mortgages, it has always
been the case that the maturity of Savings and Loan
deposits have been substantially less than the mortgages
these institutions issue.
Prior to 1966 almost all Savings and Loan deposits
were in the form of passbook accounts - deposits with-
drawable upon demand without penalty. In the early to
mid-seventies, passbook deposits came to be increasingly
replaced by certificate accounts having a longer
maturity and paying higher interest than the passbook
accounts. By 1977, 62 percent of all Savings and Loan
deposits were in the form of certificates, with 61
percent of these certificates having maturities between
two and eight years. (The remaining certificates had
8U.S. League of Savings Associations, Savings and Loan
Factbook '80, (Chicago: U.S. League of Savings
Associations, 1980).
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maturities between 90 days and 2 years.) 9
This trend toward a lengthening maturity of Savings
and Loan deposits came to an abrupt end with the intro-
duction of the variable rate six-month money market
certificate in May 1978. This six-month note, whose
interest is determined by the average discount rate on
six month Treasury Bills set at the weekly auction, has
become the most popular Savings and Loan account, making
up 35 percent of all Savings and Loan deposits, (or
29 percent of total liabilities), by December 31, 1980.
When a weighted average of the maturity of the
various types of accounts Savings and Loans offer is
taken, (weights determined by the proportion of total
deposit.s in each type of account), the fundamentally
short-term nature of Savings and Loan deposit portfolios
becomes clear. With a weighted average maturity of a
little more than three fourths of a year, the Savings
and Loan deposit portfolio has a maturity less than one-
sixth its mortgage loan portfolio. (See Table 4)
The Nature of Savings and Loans' Other Assets and
Liabilities
The tremendous difference in the maturity structure
9 See Figure 5 page for graphic display of Savings
and Loan deposit changes.
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Table 4
Balance Sheet Composition and Maturity
Structure of Insured SLA's
December 1980
Amount Percent Average Maturity
(in Millions) of Total Years
ASSETS:
Mortgage Loans 494,083 79.91 6.0
Mortgage Backed
Securities 26,996 4.37 6.0
Non-Mortgage
Consumer Loans 1 11,562 1.87 1.5
Regulatory
Liquidity 2 47,439 7.67 0.5
Other Securities 8,833 1.43 (a) one day
(b) 40 years
Fixed Long Term
Assets 3 17,312 2.80 10.0
Other Assets 12,087 1.95 (a) one day
(b) 40 years
TOTAL ASSETS 618,312 100.0
Weighted Average Asset maturity (a) 5.403
(b) 6.755
1) Includes mobilehome loans, home improvement loans,
education loans and consumer loans.
2) Includes U.S. Government and agency securities with
maturities less than one year and commercial bank
time deposits and bank acceptances with maturities
less than 6 months.
3) Includes FHLBB stock, building and equipment, real
estate and service corporation investments.
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank, Board Semi-Annual
Aggregates for FSLIC Savings and Loan
Associations - December 31, 1980.
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(Table 4 Continued)
Amount
(Millions)
LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH:
Savings Deposits:
Passbook and
N.O.W.
Fixed Rate
Certificates
Six Month Money
Market
2 Year Variable
Ceiling
Jumbo
Certificates
Borrowings:
FHLBB Advances
Other Borrowed
Money
Loans in Process
All other
Liabilities
NET WORTH
105,343
123,732
182,310
49,840
40,057
46,990
17,056
8,649
11,894
32,443
Percent
of Liabilities Average
and Net Worth Maturity
17.04
20.00
29.49
8.06
6.48
7.60
2.76
1.40
1.92
5.25
(Years)
0.76
0.05
2.00
0.05
2.00
0.50
1.25
0.50
(a) one day
(b) 40 years
Not Aolicable
TOTAL LIABILITIES 618,312 100.00
AND NET WORTH
Weighted Average Liability Maturitv:
(net worth not included)
(a) .87
(b) 1. 68
.
24
between Savings and Loan deposits and mortgage
portfolios is only partially offset by Savings and Loans'
other assets and liabilities. Next to mortgage loans,
the largest asset holdings of the nation's Savings and
Loans are those investments used to satisfy Federal Home
Loan Bank Board liquidity requirements.10 Investments
eligible to fulfill those requirements include U.S.
government and agency securities with maturities less
than five years)and commercial bank time deposits or
banker's acceptances with maturities less than six
months. Making up only 7.5 percent of Savings and Loan
asset portfolios, even if these investments consisted
of entirely shorter term securities with average maturity
of six months, the maturity structure of Savings and
Loan asset portfolio is only slightly reduced. When
combined with other Savings and Loan assets which
include the relatively short maturity (1.5 years)
consumer type loans making up approximately 1.9 percent
of Savings and Loan assets, and long term assets such as
real estate and Federal Home Loan Bank stock, the
average asset maturity of Savings and Loan assets is
anywhere from 5.4 to 6.8 years.
1 0The Board is empowered by law to vary the liquidity
ratio (ratio of eligible liquid assets/deposits and
short term borrowings) between 4-10 percent. Currently
the ratio is set at a minimum of 5 percent.
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On the liability side of the balance sheet the
next largest source of funds for Savings and Loans after
deposits, making up 7.6 percent of Savings and Loan
liabilities, are advances from the regional Federal Home
Loan Banks. Designed to cover Savings and Loan deposit
outflows or honor upcoming mortgage commitments, these
advances are by far the largest nondeposit source of
funds for the nation's Savings and Loan industry. These
advances whose maturity can range anywhere from over-
night to ten years tend to be of mixed maturity. As of
December 31, 1980, 40 percent of Federal Home Loan
Bank advances outstanding at Savings and Loans had
maturities less than one year and 60 percent has
maturities greater than one year.11
When these advances are combined with the remaining
Savings and Loan borrowings which include predominately
short-term reverse re-purchase agreements and obligations
to commercial banks, (93 percent of the obligations
contained in the generic category other borrowed money
mature within one year), it becomes clear that the short
maturity of Savings and Loan deposit portfolios is
hardly offset by Savings and Loan borrowings which are
also short term.
1 1 See Table 18, page , for a more detailed breakdown of
Insured Savings and Loan Assoc-iation borrowings as of
December 31, 1980 that includes this and other information
about S&L borrowings used in this chapter.
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Although many of the remaining Savings and Loan
liabilities represent a long--term source of funds;
mortgage backed bonds, making up one percent of S&L
liabilities (average maturity of 10 years) and paid in
capital and net worth, making up 5.25 percent of S&L
liabilities, they do not represent large enought pro-
portions of the total liability portfolio to greatly
affect its short term nature. When a weighted average
of the entire S&L liability portfolio is taken, (this
does not include net worth), the average maturity ranges
from .87 to 1.68 years - more than three times less than
the average maturity of Savings and Loans asset
portfolio. (Table 4)
Implications of Borrowing Short and Lending Long:
Exposure to Interest Rate-Risk
Similar to all other financial intermediaries the
profitability of Savings and Loan Associations depends
upon the spread between the effective return on their
asset portfolio and the effective interest rate cost
of their liabilities. To remain viable, the Savings and
Loan must realize a spread that exceeds all operating
costs and includes compensation for any risks taken.
As demonstrated in Table 5, most other financial
intermediaries in the U.S. namely Commercial Banks and
Insurance Companies, attempt to protect this spread from
27
Table 5
Estimated Maturity of Asset and Liability
Holdings of Representative Financial Institutions
Maturity Structure
based on initial holding
period.
Total Assets
(in billion of
Financial dollars)
Institution (12/31/80)
As of 12/31/73
Less Than
Five Years
Percentage
Greater Than
Five Years
Percentage
Commercial
Banks
$1,535.6 Assets
Liabilities 88
Life Insurance
Companies $486,057 Assets 5 95
Liabilities 10 90
Savings and Loan
Associations $623,744 Assets 8 92
Liabilities 92 08
Mutual Savings
Banks $170,432 Assets 5 95
Liabilities 91 09
Source: Maturity Estimates: Herbert Dougall and Jack
Gaumnitz, Capital Markets and Institutions,
Prentice Hall 1975. Federal Reserve Bulletin,
February 1981.
92 3
12
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unforseen changes in interest rates by making sure that
the maturity of each liability they accept is offset by
an asset of equal maturity. Commercial banks, like
Savings and Loans, have predominately short term
liabilities, but invest in assets that are also short
term. More than 85 percent of Commercial Banks assets
and liabilities mature within five years. Insurance
companies have similarly matched liability and asset
portfolios. More than 90 percent of Insurance Company
assets and liabilities mature in more than five years.
In both cases, this matching of asset and liability
maturities assures these institutions that the spread
between their cost of funds and their return on
investments realized on day one will also be realized
at maturity.
For the thrifts, (both Mutual Savings Banks and
Savings and Loan Associations), however, who borrow short
and lend long, there is no assurance that the spread
realized when the investment was made will continue.
Because their liabilities mature at a faster rate than
their assets, their spread will be larger or smaller
depending upon the future pattern of their saving rates.
Therefore, in trying to realize the necessary spread
between the cost of their liabilities and the return on
their assets, thrifts must set their long-term mortgage
rates in relation to their current and predicted savings
29
rates. If the thrift predicts its present and future
savings rates correctly and chooses an appropriate
mortgage rate, its return over the life of the mortgage
will be equal to all costs plus compensation for risk
borne. If the thrift guesses incorrectly on the term
structure, its profit margin will be greater or less
than this expected spread depending upon the direction
between the expected and actual cost of its liabilities
and the imbalance between asset and liability maturity
periods. 12
Hence, unlike other financial institutions that
avoid engaging in the intermediation of assets and
liabilities of different maturities, thrifts institutions
by investing in long term mortgages while relying on
short term deposits, run the risk of loss due to interest
rate fluctuations. Depending upon the movement of
interest rates, they can encounter liquidity problems
stemming from an extended and predicted rise in short
term interest rates and solvency problems stemming from
underestimates in the rise of short term interest rates.
In both cases, one temporary, the other permanent, the
1 2 Gerald Bierwag, George Kaufman, Alden Toevs, "Management
Strategies for Savings and Loan Associations to Reduce
Interest Rate Risk," in New Sources of Capital for the
Savings and Loan Industry, (San Francisco: Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco, 1979).
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thrift will face a negative spread situation; they will
be unable to generate sufficient earnings on their
assets to finance competitive savings rates.
Both the short-term liquidity and long-term solvency
problems thrifts can face is demonstrated in the model
developed by George G. Kaufman reprinted below.1 3
Figure 1
Model of Maturity Intermediation
(a) F (b)
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"Assume that the current short term
rate at time t is A and the institution
expects rates to raise smoothly to C at t.
During this period, thrift institutions are
assumed to borrow continously short and to
invest long an equal amount at the beginning
of the period. The interest rate at which the
institution will invest is given by the
geometric average of the current short-term
savings rates the institution expects. The
institution will lend long at rate B=D. The
initial spread will be AB. If the institution
predicted rates correctly, it will generate
profits during the first half of the period
equal to the triangle ABO. Profits, however,
diminish continuously. In the second half
of the period as short term rates climb
1 3George G. Kaufman, "The Thrift Problem Reconsidered,"
Journal of Bank Research, Spring 1972, p. 28.
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above the long term rate, the institution
generates accounting losses equal to the
triangle DCO. Although during this latter
period the thrift generates insufficient
current earnings on assets to finance
competitive savings rates, the liquidity
problem is only temporary and will not
affect long term earnings.14 Since
ABO=DCO the institution breaks even for
the period as a whole. If short-term
interest rates are expected to decline the
same analysis indicates that the institution
breaks even for the period as a whole.
However, the accounting loss triangle precedes
the accounting gain triangle. (Figure B)
Now assume that the thrift institution
under predicts the rise in short term rates
and they actually increase along AF rather
than AC. The gain triangle, now ABE
would be smaller than the loss triangle DFE
and the institution would realize long run
losses. In retrospect, the institution
should have been charging mortgage rate
G rather than B." 1 5
This model, in lucid form, demonstrates the
inherent gamble involved in maturity intermediation.
Savings and Loans, in holding assets and liabilities of
unmatched maturities are term structure speculators.
Gains or losses are based on how much and in what
direction future patterns of interest rates diverge from
expected changes in interest rates.
1 4 This, however, can become a problem if the thrift fails
to offset the losses in the later period with the gains
realized from the earlier period. If losses precede the
gains the thrift can always borrow temporarily from the
FHLB or other credit institutions to pay competitive
savings rates during this period of losses.
1 5Kaufman, "The Thrift Problem Reconsidered," p. 28.
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Given its speculative nature, maturity inter-
mediation is a viable strategy only under certain
economic conditions. In periods where interest rates
are stable and are expected to remain stable for long
periods of time, maturity intermediation can be a
profitable exercise. Because short-term rates on
average to be lower than long term rates, the spread
between the yield on assets and the interest cost of
liabilities for institutions that borrow short and
lend long will be higher over most phases of the credit
cycle than the spread realized by those institutions
that either borrow short and lend short or borrow long
and lend long. 1 6
On the other hand, when interest rates are volatile
and the future path of interest rates is uncertain,
(because of uncertainties about the future rate of
inflation or future economic activity), maturity inter-
mediation can result in returns much lower than
institutions with matched maturity structures. Whenever
interest rate increases exceed expectations, institutions
that borrow short and lend long will suffer reductions
in their earnings or losses. During these periods of
unexpected increases in interest rates, those institutions
1 6one explanation for the upward sloping term structure
is the existence of liquidity or risk premiums in long
term contracts. See Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers
Principles of Corporate Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1981) p. 464.
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who have chosen to match the maturity of their assets
and liabilities will avoid the abysmal performances
of those institutions that engaged in maturity inter-
mediation and guessed wrong.
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CHAPTER II
PERFORMANCE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
1950 - 1980
Until the most recent two year period, the nation's
Savings and Loan industry has been either immune,
because of a favorable term structure or protected,
because of regulation Q from the dangers associated
with extensive maturity intermediation. Now, however,
because of the persistence of inflation and the existence
of holes in the regulation Q ceiling framework, the
industry is beginning to bear the brunt of its past
mistakes in forecasting the term structure.
In this chapter, the performance of the Savings
and Loan industry between the years 1950-1980 will be
examined. This 30 year period has been divided into
three periods - 1950-1965, 1966-1978, 1979-1980 to
reflect changes in the economic and regulatory conditions
affecting the Savings and Loan industry.
The Years: 1950-1965
In the years 1950-1965, blessed by a gently rising
term structure and stable interest rates, the nation's
Savings and Loan Association consistently made mortgage
loans, paid competitive rates on their savings and made
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their great profits in the post-war period. (Table 6)
During this period, Savings and Loan profits exceeded
even those of commercial banks with their more balanced
financial structure. Net income as a percentage of
average assets averaged .94 for Savings and Loans in
this period compared with a .66 average for commercial
banks. Clearly stable and predictable interest rates
made thrift maturity intermediation extremely profitable
during this period.
The Years: 1966-1978
Beginning in 1966, however, and continuing in 1969-
1970, 1983-1974, as inflationary pressures began to
develop in the economy and monetary policy shifted to a
tighter stance, interest rates took an unexpected and
precipitous rise, well beyond Savings and Loan deposit
rates. (Table 7) In each of these periods, Congress
extended deposit rate ceilings on commercial banks to
thrift institutions and offered these institutions a
rate differential of 25-75 basis points over what
commercial banks could pay. Had it not been for the
imposition of deposit rate controls by the regulatory
authorities, the thrifts would have had to face the
uncomfortable dilemma of either paying market interest
rates on their deposits and face a massive reduction in
their earnings or face massive disintermediation of their
36
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1950-
1965
Average
Table 6
Net Income After Tax
As a Percent of Average Net Assets
1950 - 1980
Savings & Commercial Savings & Commercial
Loans Banks Year Loans Banks
1.14 .59 1966 .50 .65
1.07 .53 1967 .46 .72
.98 .55 1968 .72 .72
.99 .55 1969 .68 .84
1.02 .67 1970 .57 .88
1.08 .57 1971 .71 .86
.99 .58 1972 .77 .82
.92 .64 1973 .76 .84
.96 .74 1974 .54 .82
.97 .62 1975 .47 .78
.86 .81 1976 .64 .80
.93 .79 1977 .79 .83
1.00 .74 1978 .84 .90
.69 .73 1979 .68 .81
.72 .70 1980 .10 1.00
.66 .67
.94 .66
1966-
1980
Average .62 .82
Source: 1950-1966: Adapted from Irwin Friend, "Changes
in the Asset-Liability Structure of the Savings
and Loan Industry," Study of the Savings and
Loan Industry, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1969.
1967-1980: Savings Association of New York State
from data provided by Kaplan Smith
and Associates, Inc.
Table 7
Open Market Interest Rates and Ceiling Rates at Savings and Loan
Associations by Maturity Class
1966 - 1980
3 month
Treasury
Year Bill
6 month
S&L Treasury
Passbook
S&L
Bill. Rate
5 years
Treasury S&L
Bond Rate
10 years
Treasury S&L
Bond Rate
5.25% 5.16%
5.25 5.07
5.25 5.59
5.25 6.85
5.25 7.37
5.25 5.77
5.25 5.85
5.25-5.75 6.82
5.75 7.81
5.75 7.54
5.75 6.94
5.75 6.85
5.75-7.50 8.30
10.10 9.59
11.61 11.48
5.25% 4.66% 5.25%
5.25 4.85 5.25
5.25 5.25 5.25
5.25 6.10 5.25
6.00 6.59 6.00
6.00 5.74 6.00
6.00 6.21 6.00
6.00-7.5 6.84 6.00-7.5
7.50 7.56 7.50
7.50 7.99 7.75
7.50 7.61 7.75
7.50 7.42 7.75
7.50 8.41 7.75-8.00
7.5-10.55 9.44 8.00
7.50 - 3.00
Sources: Prior to 1970: Federal
1970-1979:
1980:
Reserve Bulletin various issues
n!T\ight Jaffee and Kenneth Rosen "The Changing Liability
Structure of Savings and Loan Associations" AREUEA Journal
Spring 1980 page 5
Federal Reserve Bulletin February 1981
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
4.85%
4.30
5.32
6.65
6.35
4.30
4.07
7.02
7.82
5.75
4.98
5.27
7.19
10.07
11.43
4.75%
4.75
4.75
4.75
5.00
5.00
5.00
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.25
5.50
5.50
5.06%
4.61
5.47
6.36
6.51
4 .52
4.49
7.20
7.95
6.11
5.26
5.53
7.58
10.06
11.36
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deposit base as consumers moved their savings to
commercial banks better equipped to pay market rates.17
Although Savings and Loan return on assets fell
30 percent from an average .94 in the 1950-1965 period
to .66 in the 1966-1978 period (Table 6), this reduction
in earnings was nowhere near what would have occured
had interest rate controls not been implemented. As
can be seen in Table 8, the effect of interest rate
ceilings through 1978, has been to protect the Savings
and Loan Industry from the rapid increases in deposit
costs that would have accompanied the sharp and un-
expected increases in market rates experienced during
these periods. Although the average yearly increase in
the six-month treasury bill during 1966, 1968-1969,
1973-1974, averaged 28 percent, Savings and Loans'
deposit costs increased by an average of only 3.79
percent.
These rather mild increases in Savings and Loan
deposit costs brought on by the extension of deposit
1 7Actually in 1966, before the imposition of controls,
most Savings and Loans opted for the latter alternative
and refused to pay market rates. It was the massive
disintermediation that followed and the enormous
reduction in mortgage lending that then occured that
spurred Congress to impose rate ceilings. For a more
detailed explanation see, The Report of the President's
Interagency Task Force on Regulation Q: Deposit Interest
Rate Ceilings and Housing Credit: (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office 1979) p. 56.
Table 8
Comparison in the Change of U.S. Treasury Bills and Change in
Savings and Loan Deposit Costs
1966 - 1980
Percentage Percentage
6 month Change Average Interest Change
T. Bill From Prior Year Paid on Deposits From Prior Yea
5.06%
4.61
5.47
6.86
6.51
4.52
4.49
7.20
7.95
6.11
5.26
5.23
7.58
10.06
11.36
24.95%
(19.76)
18.66
75.41
5.10)
(30.57)
0.66)
60.36
10.42
(23.14)
(13.91)
5.13
37.07
32.72
12.92
4.48%
4.68
4.71
4.81
5.14
5.30
5.37
5.51
5.96
6.21
6.31
6.39
6.65
7.50
8.98
5.41%
4.46
.64
2.12
6.86
3.11
1.32
2.61
8.17
4.19
1.61
1.27
4.07
12.78
19.73
Bank Board Journal various issues.
rYear
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
wJ
Source: Federal Home Loan
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rate ceilings, prevented these institutions from
experiencing the sharp erosion in their spreads that
would have occured had these market rates been paid.
Bogged down by the slow turnover of their mortgage
portfolios, their mortgage portfolios yields increased
by an average of only 2.52 percent during the 1966,
1968-1969, 1973-1974 period while newly issued mortgage
rates increased by an average of 10.11 percent, (Table 9)
the nation's Savings and Loan industry would have
experienced a negative spread had deposit rate increases
approximated increases in open market rates. Instead,
however, because of deposit rate ceilings, the industry
experienced a spread during these high interest
periods that was not substantially different from periods
where interest rates were more moderate. The spread
in the 1966-1978 period, despite wide interest rate
gyrations, averaged 154 basis points with a standard
deviation of only 16 basis points. (Table 10)
As it turned out, however, these deposit rate
ceilings, so effective in controlling the cost of thrift
funds and preventing losses in times of rapidly rising
interest rates, became increasingly ineffective in
preventing disintermediation as interest sensitive
consumers turned to investment vehicles outside the
Table 9
Comparison of the Newly Issued Mortgage Rate and
Average Return on Mortgage Portfolio for Savings and Loans
1966 - 1980
Newly Issued
Mortage Rate
6.45%
6.57
7.13
8.02
8.55
7.77
7.67
8.32
9.22
9.10
9.08
9.02
9.56
10.87
12.86
-Change
From Prior
10.26%
1.86
8.52
12.48
6.61
(9.12)
(1.29)
8.47
10.82
(1.30)
(0.22)
(0.66)
5.99
13.70
18.31
Year
Average Interest
Return on Mortgage
5.97%
5.97
6.11
6.32
6.56
6.81
6.98
7.17
7.43
7.66
7.95
8.21
8.54
8.95
9.44
Change
From Prior
0.67%
0.00
2.35
3.44
3.80
3.81
2.50
2.72
3.63
3.10
3.79
3.27
4.02
4.80
5.47
Source: Prior to 1975: Dwight M. Jaffee, "The Asset/Liability Maturity Mix of
S&Ls: Problems and Solutions," in Change in the Savings and Loan Industry
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco: 1976, p. 70.
After 1975: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal various issues.
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Year
H
Year Mor a e Rate
Table 10
Interest Rates Paid on Deposits and Interest Return on Mortgages
1966 - 1980
(1) (2)
Average Interest Change From
Year Paid on Deposits Prior Year
4.48%
4.68
4.71
4.81
5.14
5.30
5.37
5.51
5.96
6.21
6.31
6.39
6.65
7.50
8.98
5.41%
4.46
.64
2.12
6.86
3.11
1.32
2.61
8.17
4.19
1.61
1.27
4.07
12.78
19.73
(3) (4) (5)
Average Interest Change From Average Spread
Return on Mortgages Prior Year (3) - (1)
5.97%
5.97
6.11
6.32
6.56
6.81
6.98
7.17
7.43
7.66
7.95
8.21
8.54
8.95
9.44
.67%
0
2.35
3.44
3.80
3.81
2.50
2.72
3.63
3.10
3.79
3.27
4.02
4.80
5.47
2.49%
1.29
1.40
1.51
1.42
1.51
1.61
1.66
1.47
1.45
1.64
1.82
1.89
1.45
.46
Source: Prior to 1975: Dwight M. Jaffee, "The Asset/Liability Maturity Mix of
S&Ls: Problems and Solutions," in Change in the Savings and Loan Industry
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco: 1976, p. 70.
After 1975: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal various issues.
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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banking system to obtain market yields.
As demonstrated in Figure 2, in each successive
period of monetary restraint, 1966, 1969-1970, 1973-
1974, 1979-1980 consumers increased their holding of
direct financial investments (such as U.S. Treasury Bills
or corporate securities) paying market rates and reduced
their holdings of depository savings, paying ceiling
rates below market rates. The impact of these changes
on household savings flows upon Savings and Loan
Associations is revealed in Table 11. During each
of these periods when market interest rates exceeded
depository ceilings, withdrawals from Savings and
Loans almost always equalled new savings received
reducing the inflow of funds to Savings and Loans to
a trickle. (The withdrawal ratio exceeds .9 during each
of these periods.)
In response Savings and Loans were unable to main-
tain their level of mortgage lending during these high
interest rate periods and had to increasingly rely
upon advances from the regional Federal Home Loan Banks
both to provide liquidity and to honor mortgage
commitments.
These fluctuations in mortgage lending and the use
of Federal Home Loan Bank advances based on interest rate
changes is demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4. Although
Savings and Loan consistently account for more than 50
Figure 2: Annual Change in Depository Savings and Direct Investments of Households
1960 - 1979
Billions of Dollars
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Source: Savings and Loan Factbook '80
Table 11
Gross Saving Flows for Savings and Loan Associations
(1)
New Savings
Year Received
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
39,581
42,277
41,890
45,678
56,467
69,023
85,211
100,837
111,649
138,353
165,434
196,315
245,701
330,641
424,177
(2)
Withdrawals
40,133
36, 148
39, 151
46,680
51,172
48,370
61,327
90,330
106,982
109,055
131,065
164,312
222,239
315,611
413,509
1966 - 1980
(2)/(l)
Withdrawal
Ratio Di
1.010
.855
.935
1.022
.906
.701
.720
.896
.958
.788
.792
.837
.904
.954
.975
(4)
Interest and
vidends Credited
4,084
4,338
4,518
4,886
5,548
6,679
8,072
9,436
10,927
12,755
15,359
18,189
20,713
23,866
30,288
(5)
Net Inflow
3,533
10,467
7,256
3,884
10,843
27,332
31,956
19,943
15,595
42,052
49,729
50,192
44,175
38,897
40,956
Sources: Prior to 1979: Jaffee and Rosen, "The Changing Liability Structure of
SLA's," p. 45.
1979, 1980: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal February 1981.
uL
Figure 3: Changes in S&L Mortgage Holdings as a Percent of Changes in Total
100- Residential Mortgages
90 1950 - 1980
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Source: Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts 1946-1978
and Flow of Funds Accounts 4th Quarter 1980.
inin Federal Home Loan Bank Advances to the
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*Calculations made be dividing net change in FHLB advances by the net change
in S&L held liabilities for each quarter.
Source: Prior to 1979: Neil G. Berkman "Mortgage Finance and the Housing
Cycle" New England Economic Review, September/October 1979.
1979-1980: Flow of Funds Quarterly Data 4th Quarter 1980.
1980
Figure 4: Ratio of the
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percent of any new home mortgage lending when interest
rates are low and funds are plentiful, their share of
home mortgage lending falls off substantially, below
40 percent, when interest rates are high and their
deposit sources dwindle. It is just at these times
of high interest rates, 1966, 1969-1970, 1973-1974, 1979-
1980 that Savings and Loan rely heavily on Federal Home
Loan Bank advances as a source of funds. During these
periods of sluggish deposit growth, advances often
account for more than 50 percent of the increase in
total liability inflows. Once interest rates decline,
however, and deposit inflows increase, these loans
are rapidly repaid, (that's why the ratio is often
negative after being substantially positive).
It was the threat of a new episode of disinter-
mediation and the collapse of the housing market in
the face of rapidly escalating interest rates, that led
the regulators in the spring of 1978 to consider a new
deposit instrument for financial institutions that would
allow them to attract and retain funds during high interest
rate periods. This instrument, the six-month money
1 8 Since S&Ls are major supplies of mortgage credit,
declines in the supply of credit due to disintermediation
have traditionally been a cause of a cyclical downtown in
housing starts. See Neil G. Berkman "Mortgage Finance
and the Housing Cycle," New England Economic Review,
September-October 1979.
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market certificate was designed to provide high balance,
interest rate sensitive investors a competitive yield
on their investment regardless of open market rates.
The Years: 1978-1980
The introduction of the money market certificate
in June of 1978 revolutionized the Savings and Loan
industry. For the first time since the imposition of
deposit controls in 1966, thrifts were no longer fully
protected from rapid increases in their deposit costs
caused by rapid increases in open market rates.
As interest rates continued their steep though
sometimes interrupted climb throughout 1978-1980
consumers increasingly turned away from the fixed
ceiling passbook and certificate accounts offered by
Commercial Banks and Thrifts and turned to the newly issued
money market certificate and the increasingly popular,
money market funds (available only outside the banking
system) that offered savers a competitive rate on their
savings. Between June of 1978 and December of 1980,
Savings and Loan passbook and fixed-rate certificate
accounts declined 40 percent from $381.7 billion to
$229 billion; during this same period Savings and Loan
money market certificates increased to $182 billion and
money market funds increased their assets from $10
50
billion to $75 billion.19
The impact of this large scale exodus of Savings
and Loan deposits out of passbook and fixed rate
accounts' and into the newly introduced money market
certificates radically transformed Savings and Loan
deposit portfolios. Where in the beginning of June 1978
only 3 percent of Savings and Loan deposits were market
rate sensitive, (jumbo certificates were the only
Savings and Loan deposit account without regulatory
ceilings at that time) by the end of December 1980, due
largely to the rapid growth of the money market
certificate, over one half of Savings and Loan deposits
were market rate sensitive. (Figure 5)
This rapid transformation of Savings and Loan
deposits to market rate sensitive accounts exposed
them as never before to the maturity intermediation
risk associated with a cyclical rise in interest rates.
As interest rates continued their rapid yet sometimes
interrupted rise, throughout 1979-1980, Savings and
Loan deposit costs registered their largest increases
in their history, far in excess of increases in their
mortgage portfolio yields. (Table 8 pg. 39) In 1979,
1 9Money market certificate figures obtained from various
issues of the Federal Home Loan Bank News. Money Market
Mutual Fund Figures from various issues of the Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
Figure 5: Changes in the Account Structure of Savings and Loan Deposits
Fixed Rate Certificate Accounts
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deposit costs increased by 12.78 percent, and in 1980,
as money market certificate growth surged when short
term interest rates reached their highest levels in
the post war era, deposit cost increased 19.73 percent.
These rapid increases in deposit costs were in marked
contrast to the increases registered on Savings and
Loan slow-to-turnover mortgage portfolio which
increased by only 4.80 percent in 1979 and 5.47 percent
in 1980. (Table 9 pg. 41)
As a result of this tremendous increase in Savings
and Loan deposit costs and the only sluggish increases
on the return of their mortgage portfolio, the average
spread between the return on Savings and Loan mortgage
portfolios and the rate paid on their deposits
plummented, dropping 23 percent in 1979, and a whopping
68 percent in 1980. By year-end 1980, this spread had
dropped by far to the lowest level in Savings and Loan
history, to .46 basis points, a full 96 basis points
less than the previous low experienced in 1970.
(Figure 6)
This enormous reduction in the spread between the
return on Savings and Loan mortgage portfolios and the
rate paid on their deposits, caused by high interest
rates and the increasing rate sensitivity of Savings
and Loan deposit portfolios, severely impacted Savings
and Loan earnings. These earnings, however, were also
Figure 6: Changes in the Average Spread Between Interest Return
on Mortgages and Interest Paid on Deposits for S&L's
1952 - 1980
I I
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Source: Prior to 1975: Dwight M. Jaffee, "The Asset/Liability Maturity Mix of
S&Ls" Problems and Solutions," in Change in the Savings and Loan Industry
Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco: 1976, p. 70.
After 1975: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal various issues.
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severely impacted by sharp increases in Savings and Loan
borrowing costs which increased Savings and Loan cost
of funds even further. (Figure 7)
In 1979 net income as a percentage of average
assets dropped 21 percent from .83 percent to .65. In
1980, this figure declines further to .10. This steep
decline in Savings and Loans' income made it by far the
worst earnings year in the industry's post W.W. II
history. As can be seen in (Table 6, pg. 36), the 1980
low of .10 is much lower than the previous low of .46
experienced by the industry in 1967.
Continued Problems with Disintermediation
The introduction of the money market certificate,
contrary to its stated purpose, has not ended the dis-
intermediation experienced by Savings and Loan during
previous periods of rising interest rates. Although
better than any other Savings and Loan deposit account
(except unregulated $100,000 jumbo certificates) in
attracting depositors funds, the money market certificate
still was not competitive enough with direct market
investments to divert large amounts of funds away from
credit markets. The rate paid on these money market
certificates, 25 basis points above the Treasury Bill
55
Figure 7: Average interest dividend rate on savings
accounts, average interest rate on borrowed
funds, and average cost of funds - FSLIC-
insured S&Ls (Semiannually at annual rates).
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Source: Richard Pickering "Association Earnings
First Half 1980," Federal Home Loan
Bank Journal, October 1980, p. 33.
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discount rate was still below the actual yields
received on these securities.20 These yield differences
between Treasury Bills and Money Market Certificates
were highlighted for higher income investors by the tax
advantages of Treasury Bills which unlike money market
certificates are not subject to state or local income
taxes.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the
Money Market Certificate did not offer investors the
liquidity of credit market investments or money
market funds. Redemption of money market certificates
principal, prematurely, is subject to a 3 month interest
rate penalty. Thus is in contrast to money market funds,
where redemptions can be made at any time without cost,
and Treasury Bills, which can be sold in financial
markets at any time for slight transaction costs.
The yield disadvantages of purchasing money
market certificates rather than Treasury Bills or other
such competitive instruments, was greatly increased in
March 1979, when regulators, concerned about the impact
of these certificates upon the cost of thrift funds,
withdrew some of its yield increasing attributes.
2 0 For example, the actual yield on Treasury Bills issued
at a discount of 15.64 percent on May 15, 1981 is 17.17
percent; (assuming no interest compounding) this is 128
basis points above the maximum 15.89 percent permitted on
Money Market Certificates.
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In addition to prohibiting the compounding of interest
on all money market certificates, new regulations
prohibited thrift institutions from offering 25 basis
points more than commercial banks on these certificates
whenever the Treasury Bill rate was greater than 8.75
percent. 2 1
As a consequence of all these changes, Savings and
Loan Associations still remained subject to sluggish
deposit growth in times of rapid rising interest rates.
As demonstrated in Table 11 page 45, the withdrawal
ratio in 1979-1980 as in similar previous high rate
periods approached unity (.954 in 1979, .975 in 1980)
as investors not finding better yields at Savings and
Loan Associations, placed their funds into open market
instruments, money market funds or similar yielding
commercial bank money market certificates.
This sluggish depository growth experienced during
this 1979-1980 period as in other high interest rate
periods translated into reduced levels of mortgage
lending. Where in 1978 Savings and Loans accounted for
more than 40 percent of the total increase in home
mortgage lending, this share fell to 35 percent in 1979
2 1 The regulators for the same reason placed a 12 percent
rate ceiling on the variable rate 2 year savings
certificate only one month after its initial issuance in
January of 1980. For the most part, throughout 1980, its
yield was not competitive with open market instruments
of similar maturity.
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and 23 percent in 1980. As can be seen in Figure 3
page 46, the Savings and Loan's share of increase
in home mortgage lending in 1980 was the smallest since
1966.
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CHAPTER III
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 1979-1980: A GLIMPSE INTO
THE FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE FUTURE
1979 and 1980 have been watershed years for the
Savings and Loan industry. For the first time, because
of changes in the economic and regulatory environemnt,
the industry has become exposed to the dangers involved
in maturity intermediation. In this chapter, I will
briefly describe these forces that have transformed the
Savings and Loan economic and regulatory environment
and have made the Savings and Loan business of borrowing
short and lending long more risky than ever before. In
addition, I will also look more closely at the present
condition of the industry and its likely future condition
given different alternative rate scenarios.
Increasing Interest Rate Volatility and Uncertainty
about Future Economic Conditions
Throughout 1979-1980, the nation's Savings and
Loan Associations operated in an environment of un-
surpassed interest rate volatility. As can be seen in
Table 12, the week to week change in 90 day Treasury
Bill rates averaged 50 basis points in the period
October 1979 through December 1980, almost twice the
Table 12
Week to Week Changes in 90 Day Treasury Bill Rates
1970 - 1980
Average Change
in Basis Points
Largest Basis
Point Increase
Largest Basis
Point Decrease
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1/1/79 -
10/6/79
10/6/79-
12/31/80
Sources:
Federal Reserve Bulletin 2/81.
Year
Lowest
Rate
Highest
Rate
Rate
15
14
10
20
28
15
8
7
14
15
50
27
41
34
74
91
56
30
24
103
80
54
43
125
146
56
23
9
19
73
4.77%
3.28
3.05
5.16
6.64
5.00
4 .27
4.34
6.20
8.83
6.44
61
8.02%
5.46
5.15
8.88
9.37
5.53
5.53
6.20
9.28
10.45
16.76
M-
159 171
Through 10/4/80: James Christian, "Savings Associations and the
New Monetary Policy," Economic Working Paper
#29, U.S. League of Savings Associations, December 1980.
After 10/4/80:
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volatility experienced in the last period of monetary
stringency 1973-1974. During this most recent period,
the Treasury bill rate had week to week changes of
more than 150 basis points with peaks as high as 16.76
percent and as low as 6.5 percent.
This tremendous volatility in interest rates through-
out the latter 1979, 1980 period corresponded to an
accelerating rate of inflation, a short and mild
recession, and perhaps most fundamentally, to a change
in Federal Reserve monetary policy.2 2
On October 6, 1979 the federal announced it would
pay more attention to the money supply rather than
interest rates in its attempt to curb soaring inflation.
The pre October 1979 approach of using a federal funds
interest rate target for day-to-day open market
operations had the effect of reducing the amplitude of
changes in interest rates. Now, however, with the shift
of monetary policy away from interest rate to monetary
aggregate management, short term interest rates have
been allowed to fluctuate over a much broader range, to
more readily reflect current economic conditions. This
of course has resulted in unprecidented interest rate
2 2 James W. Christian "Savings Associations and the New
Monetary Policy: The First Year in Review," Economic
Working Paper #29, U.S. League of Savings Associations,
1981.
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volatility over the year since the Federal policy
change, and, depending upon future economic conditions,
can result in further highly volatile interest rates
in the future.
Increasing Need to Pay Competitive Rates on Deposits
The escalation of open market interest rates in
1979-1980, spurred the proliferation of new financial
instruments designed to offer both large and small
savers alike competitive market yields, and provided
the motivation for increasing numbers of savers, to
make use of these instruments. Throughout this period,
Savings and Loan Associations, as well as other
depository institutions, witnessed an unprecidented
exodus of deposits out of their regulatory fixed rate
accounts and into either their own or their competitors
money market certificates, or out of the banking system
entirely into either money market mutual funds or
direct investment in open market instruments.
Between June of 1978 and December of 1980, the
nation's Savings and Loan Associations lost $152
billion dollars or 40 percent of their passbook and
fixed rate certificate accounts. Although, they did
in turn make up these deposit losses, (and then some),
by offering consumers higher yielding money market
certificates, (these totaled $182.3 billion by December
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1980) they were losing their share of the total increase
in retail savings. As demonstrated in Table 13, the
nation's Savings and Loans Associations captured only
$20.4 billion of the total $111.6 billion increase
in retail savings mobilized by all financial institutions
between October 1979 and September of 1980. This 18.3
percent market share was by far the lowest in the
decade.
The major reason for this decline was the increasing
popularity of money market mutual funds as an improved
savings alternative for the small saver. Prior to the
development of money market funds in the mid-seventies;
small savers access to credit markets were limited.
The large minimum denomination for most government and
corporate securities and the brokerage fees involved
in accessing the market precluded all but the most
wealthy households from participating in credit
markets in a regular way.
The innovative Money Market Fund effectively
removed these restrictions. In a money market fund
a saver with as little as $1000 can receive market
interest rates- and redeem their principal at any time
by check without fees. The yield and liquidity
characteristics of these funds make them superior to
any regular savings account for the small saver and
even compare favorably to the money market certificate.
Table 13*
Relative Share of Increase in Retail Savings'
1970 - 1980
Total Savings &
Year Increase Loan Share
(billions) %
1970 54.9 20.2
1971 71.7 37.7
1972 73.6 42.7
1973 52.6 36.7
1974 46.5 32.3
1975 104.9 39.6
1976 92.7 52.5
1977 120.5 39.8
1978 128.1 30.8
1979 92.9 24.5
10/79-
09/80 111.6 18.3
Mutual Savings Credit Union Commercial Money Market
Bank Share Share Bank Share Fund Share
% % 0 %
3.1
13.1
13.7
9.1
4.7
10.6
13.6
8.1
6.0
2.9
3.5
8.2
4.0
4.5
5.3
6.5
5.2
6.6
6.1
5.5
5.1
4.3
68.5
45.2
39.1
48.9
52.8
42.8
27.8
45.6
52.3
41.7
35.5
3.7
1.8
0.2
0.3
5.5
25.8
38.5
*'Retail Savings includes time and savings deposits, excluding
but including interest credited.
jumbo certificates
Source: James Christian, "Savings Associations and the New Monetary Policy,"
Economic Working Paper #29, U.S. League of Savings Associations,
December 1980.
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As more and more savers learned of these funds
and more institutions offered them, (there were 114
money market mutual funds in May of 1981 compared to
under 50 in May of 1979) their growth has accelerated.
During the first two months of 1981 the growth in
money market fund assets doubled the growth in Savings
and Loan money market certificates. Between December
31, 1980 and February 28, 1981 money market fund
assets grew $26.6 billion from $74.6 billion to $101.2
billion. During this same period, Savings and Loan
money market certificates grew by only $12 billion from
$182.3 billion to $194.3 billion. If growth rates in
Money Market funds continue at this pace, they'll be
up to $250 billion by the end of 1981 surpassing the
size of money market certificate deposits.23
Thus, burdened by the regulatory changes in 1979
and 1980, which limited the yields of both 6 month and
2 year certificate accounts when interest rates were
above regulatory rate ceilings, and lacking deposit
instruments that would provide small investors the
same short term market yields and liquidity as the
money market funds, the nation Savings and Loan
Associations were having difficulties competing for
2 3 Tom Herman "Explosive Asset Growth: Money Market Funds
Rose 3% to $101.21 Billion in Latest Week, Setting 10th
Consecutive Record." Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1981,
and Federal Home Loan Bank Board News, March 1981.
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funds even despite the introduction of their new money
market and small saver certificate accounts.
It is clear from the 1979-1980 experience that
the Savings and Loan Industry operating in an environment
of increasing public sophistication and growing
investment alternatives must offer competitive deposit
instruments paying competitive rates to survive in the
financial environment of the eighties.
Implications of These Changes: The Danger of Savings and
Loan Insolvency
With a future consisting of continued interest rate
volatility and a deposit portfolio reflecting more
competitive yields, the Savings and Loan industry as
it currently is structured could be in grave danger.
Even now, although the industry as a whole has yet to
face a losing year and has continued to make contributions
to net worth, there are many signs of weakness. The
Federal Home Loan Bank Board estimated that 35 percent
of all Federally insured Savings and Loans lost money
in 1980 with many of these associations showing losses
located in the Northeast. In New York State, for
instance, where usury ceilings (enforced until 1979)
and low mortgage turnover have reduced mortgage
portfolio yields, (New York Savings and Loan Association's
mortgage portfolios yielded 8.68 percent compared to
8.95 percent for Savings and Loan Associations
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nationally), more than 70 percent of that state's
Savings and Loan Associations lost money in 1980.
Losses for that industry totaled $129 million or 48
cents for every $100 of assets.24 For some 400 of
the nation's 4600 Savings and Loan Association's, 1980
losses were so great they were unable to satisfy the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)
net worth requirements of 5 percent of total liabilities.
(National Average is 5.53 percent.) One hundred twenty
of these associations were classified as "problem
associations" by the FSLIC with net worth levels below
2.5 percent. 2 5
Moreover, to present association defaults, the
FSLIC helped 31 troubled Savings and Loan Associations
into mergers in 1980, more than double any other year
in the past decade. To facilitate these mergers, the
FSLIC laid out over $1.3 billion to absorb low yielding
mortgage assets of sick associations; a sum exceeding
the expense for all such assisted mergers in the
FSLIC's 50 year history.26 It is clear that if the
2 4 Savings Association of New York State "Savings and
Loan Operating Ratios" February 26, 1981.
2 5Brooks Jackson, "Regulators Seek to Ease Anxieties
over Dismal State of S&L Industry," Wall Street Journal
March 20, 1981.
2 6Ibid.
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high rates reached in 1980 persist much longer more
Savings and Loans will falter. Jonathan Gray, a thrift
industry analyst for Sanford Bernstein Company, an
investment banking firm in New York, estimated that
Savings and Loan Industry losses in the first half of
1981 could reach 2.5 billion dollars if the Treasury
Bill rates continue at the 14 average level of January
and February.27
The problem, in an increasingly inflationary
economy, is the industry's low yielding fixed-rate
mortgage portfolio. As can be seen in the profile of
this portfolio, as of September 1980, produced as
Table 14, almost 40 percent of the portfolio consists
of mortgages yielding below 9 percent, and an additional
20 percent (66 percent of the mortgage portfolio) were
in mortgages yielding below 10 percent; yields well
below current saving rates and expectations of future
saving rates. As of September 30, 1980 only 6.70
percent of the nation's Savings and Loan mortgage
2 7As of this writing, Treasury Bill rates have dropped
to near 12 percent making these predictions a bit high.
Assuming 12 percent average interest rates through June,
Gray estimates the industry would most likely have a six
month loss of 750 million to 1.5 billion dollars. Charles
Elia "S&L's $2.5 Billion Loss in First Half Seen Possible
if Six Month Treasury Bills Average 144%" Wall Street
Journal, March 15, 1981.
69
Table 14
Mortgage Loan Portfolio Structure of the
Savings and Loan Industry
September 1980
Mortgage Interest Percent of Loans Cumulative
Rate Earning Rate Percentage
Under 5.50 .44 .44
5.50 - 5.99 .81 1.25
6.00 - 6.49 1.75 3.00
6.50 - 6.99 1.62 4.62
7.00 - 7.49 4.04 8.66
7.50 - 7.99 5.47 14.13
8.00 - 8.49 5.44 19.57
8.50 - 8.99 17.44 37.01
9.00 - 9.49 15.47 52.48
9.50 - 9.99 14.19 66.67
10.00 - 10.49 7.80 74.47
10.50 - 10.99 6.49 80.96
11.00 - 11.49 4.52 85.48
11.50 - 11.99 4.79 90.27
12.00 - 12.49 2.94 93.21
12.50 and over 6.70 100.00
Source: "Mortgage Portfolio Yields Aren't Growing Fast
Enough," Savings and Loan News, December 1980.
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Table 15
Proportionate Shortfall of S&L Mortgage
Portfolio Yields Relative to New Mortgage Yields
1965 - 1980
(1)
Mortgage Return
on Mortgages
Held Annual
Percent
(2)
FHLBB Series
of Effective
Mortgage/Rates
on New Homes
(3)
Proportionate
Shortfall of S&L
Mortgage Portfolio
Yields Relative
To new Mortgage
Rates
(2)- (1)
(2)
1965 5.93 5.81 (2.07)
1966 5.94 6.25 4.96
1967 6.01 6.46 6.97
1968 6.13 6.97 12.05
1969 6.32 7.81 19.08
1970 6.56 8.45 22.37
1971 6.81 7.74 12.02
1972 6.98 7.60 8.16
1973 7.17 7.95 9.81
1974 7.43 8.92 16.70
1975 7.66 9.01 14.98
1976 7.95 8.99 11.57
1977 8.21 9.01 8.88
1978 8.47 9.54 11.22
1979 8.83 10.77 18.01
1980 9.44 12.84 27.32
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal
various issues.
Year
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portfolio yielded 12.50 percent or over.28
The drag on S&L's mortgage portfolio caused by
accelerating inflation made the industry technically
insolvent. Because of the relatively low yields of
many of the mortgages outstanding in the S&L mortgage
portfolio, the average yield of that portfolio is well
below current mortgage rates. Just how much below
current mortgage rates, the S&L's mortgage portfolio
yields are, gives a rough indication of the unbooked
losses incurred on the portfolio. As can be seen in
Table 15, the 1980 yield on the industry's mortgage
portfolio was 27 percent below current mortgage rates,
the lowest it has been since 1965.
If this 27 percent shortfall, based on current
mortgage rates, were valued based on the year-end 1990n
$494 billion S&L morgage portfolio, the loss incurred
would be $133 million. If these losses were in turn
cnarged against net worth, the industry would have a
negative net worth of approximately $100 billion. 2 9
2 8 By December 1980, the proportion of mortgage loans
yielding 12.50 percent and over is likely to have
increased to approximately 10 percent.
2 9 These figures must be considered to be upper bounds.
Because of prepayments, many of the low yielding mortgages
in the S&L mortgage portfolio would not remain out-
standing until maturityand therefore many of the losses
cited would be less.
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Although only technically insolvent today, the
industry would reach permanent insolvency if interest
rates persist at their present levels much longer.
Richard Marcis, Chief Economist for the Office of Economic
Research, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in a simulation
of S&L performance through the eighties, discovered
that if interest rates, because of further high
inflation, averaged 14 percent through 1988, the industry
would register continuous yearly income losses that would
deplete all S&L net worth by 1985, and cause $100 billion
negative net worth by 1988.30 On the other hand, in
a simulation assuming less inflation through 1988,
(average Treasury Bill rate of 9 percent), the industry
would register impressive gains in income and net
worth. By 1988, under this low interest rate scenario
industry net worth would stand at $76.3 billion more
than double its present $32 billion. 3 1
In preparation of this former scenario, Savings
and Loan regulators have developed contingency plans
to save the industry from default. These plans usually
involve the sale of low yielding- thrift mortgage assets
to the government at par who then either sells, ware-
3 0 Richard Marcis "The Savings and Loan Industry in the
80's" Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal, May 1980.
3 1 Ibid.
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houses or permanently holds these assets. 3 2
Although these emergency measures may, at great
financial cost to the government, protect the industry
from the immediate solvency danger caused by high interest
rates, high deposit costs, and a low yielding mortgage
portfolio, they cannot prevent the industry from falling
into another solvency crisis sometime in the future.
Even at today's high interest rates, it is not in-
conceivable that rates might go substantially higher
making the yields on mortgages S&L's are currently
making insufficient to cover increases in deposits costs.
As long as Savings and Loan continue to invest in
assets that are predominately long term and depend upon
short term deposits whose yields fluctuate with short
term rates, the industry will continue to bear substantial
interest rate risk. In these times of great economic
uncertainty and unprecidented rate volatility in
financial markets, Savings and Loan maturity inter-
mediation is and will continue to be a perilous
exercise.
3 2 Short-run solutions to the solvency crisis will be
discussed in greater detail in the last chapter. For a
detailed discussion of a number of such plans, also see
U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Report of the Inter-
agency Task Force on Thrift Institutions (Washington, DC:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 221-251.
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The Possibilities of a Balanced S&L Asset/Liability
Structure: An Introduction to Part II
Ever since 1966, when inflation and the inverted
term structure first affected the Savings and Loan
Industry, major studies were commissioned by the
executive branch, Congress and the regulatory agencies
to study the thrift problem.33 Out of these studies
numerous recommendations have been made for restructuring
the Savings and Loan industry so that their exposure
to interest risk would be reduced.
Beginning slowly in the early seventies, and
increasing at faster pace thereafter many of the
recommendations coming out of these studies, giving
Savings and Loan Associations more flexibility in
balancing the maturities of their assets and liabilities
have been implemented in piecemeal reforms were
supplemented by Congress in a comprehensive reform
package - The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980.
3 3 These studies began with the Friend Study of the
Savings and Loan Industry commissioned in 1966 by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board. This was followed in 1971
by the Nixon appointed Hunt Commission report, and by the
Congressionally commissioned FINE Study in 1975. The
latest report has been by the Interagency Task Force
on thrift institutions commissioned by Congress under
the Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980.
For an excellent discussion of the history of financial
reform and the summaries of the various reform documents
see Kent W. Colton, "Financial Reform: A Review of the
Past and Prospects for the Future," AREUEA Journal 8
(Spring 1980) pp. 91-117.
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In the second half of this thesis, I will look
closely at these innovations and reforms developed by
Congress, the regulatory agencies and the Savings and
Loan Industry to rectify the Savings and Loan asset/
liability mismatch. Specifically I will be looking at
these reforms with the intent of answering the following
questions: Are these reforms sufficient to allow S&L's
to act in the future financial environment without
substantial interest rate risk? What are the implications
of these reforms both upon the Savings and Loan
Industry and housing finance?
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PART II
INNOVATION AND REFORM IN THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
77
CHAPTER IV
PERFORMING TRADITIONAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
FUNCTIONS WITHOUT INTEREST RATE RISK: TOOLS
AVAILABLE TO BALANCE THEIR ASSET-LIABILITY MISMATCH
Ever since the first monetary crunch of 1966,
caused by soaring inflation, regulators have instituted
numerous reforms designed to help Savings and Loans
match the maturity of their assets and liabilities.
These innovations have been directed at, either
lengthening the maturity of Savings and Loan liabilities,
(by issuing longer term deposits or borrowings), to
conform to the long maturity of Savings and Loan mortgage
assets, or shortening the maturity of Savings and Loan
mortgage assets (by offering floating as opposed to
fixed rate mortgages) to conform to the short maturity
of Savings and Loan liabilities.
This chapter will systematically analyze these
innovations, and determine whether they permit Savings
and Loans to pursue their traditional functions as
household depositories and home mortgage lenders
without bearing the substantial interest rate risk
characteristic of the past.
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Depository Tools
One of the first innovations regulators made to
help the Savings and Loan industry rectify their asset-
liability mismatch was the introduction of the fixed
rate certificate account in 1970 as an alternative to
the traditional passbook account. This instrument,
intended to lengthen the industry's deposit structure
and provide greater stability in their average cost of
funds, was designed to encourage depositors to commit
their savings for longer periods of time, (by paying
rates 50 to 225 basis points higher than the pass-
book rate on accounts with maturities ranging from
2-8 years), and to discourage depositors from re-
deeming their funds prior to maturity, (by imposing
a 6 month interest rate penalty on funds subject to
early withdrawal).
These certificates, issued with great success in
the stable interest rate environment of the mid-
seventies, where they accounted for an increasing
proportion of Savings and Loan deposits, have been
unsuccessful in either retaining existing certificate
accounts or attracting new deposits in the high
interest periods of 1978-1980. As short term interest
rates rose well beyond the rate paid on even the
longest maturity certificate accounts, (6 month Treasury
Bills average yields of 7.58 percent in 1978, 10.10
79
percent in 1979, and 11.36 percent in 1980 compared
to the rate of 7.50 paid on 8 year certificates),
savers bore the interest rate penalty, emptied their
savings from these certificate accounts and invested
them in other savings vehicles offering competitive
rates. Where in June 1978, long-term fixed-rate
certificate accounts balances totalled $238 billion or
60 percent of total savings deposits, by December 1980
balances in these accounts declined 48 percent to
.34
$123.8 billion or 24 percent of total savings deposits.
In an attempt to assure that the nation's Savings
and Loans would continue to attract long term deposits
even in periods where market rates exceeded deposit
ceilings, the regulators experimented in 1973, 1979,
and 1980 with longer-term, variable rate certificates
that offered investors more competitive rates on their
savings. The 2 year small saver certificate first
offered January 1980, is the most recent example of
this type instrument currently available at the nation's
3 4 Calculated from various issues of the Federal Home
Loan Bank News.
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Savings and Loan Associations. 3 5
This 2 year or more certificate whose ceiling
rate offered for the week is based on the average
yield of 2 year or comparable maturity Treasury
securities for the previous week has been more effective
than regulatory fixed certificates in attracting house-
hold funds throughout 1980. As demonstrated in Table
16, and Table 17, balances in 2 year certificate
accounts increased by an average of $4,153 million per
month in 1980 compared to an average monthly loss of
$5,022 million for the regulatory fixed certificate
accounts. By December 31, 1980 balances in variable
rate 2 year certificate totalled $49.8 billion or
9.9 percent of total S&L deposits.
The effectiveness of these 2 variable rate
certificate accounts in attracting consumer's deposit
dollars during high interest rate periods has been
reduced by the imposition of a 12 percent maximum rate
35These previously permitted variable rate instruments
included the "wild card certificate" offered for only
4 months in 1973 which contained no rate ceiling on
deposits of $1000 or more for maturities of 4 year or
more. This was followed in 1979, by a new 4 year or
more certificate which had a ceiling tied to the
weekly average yield of 4 year Treasury securities.
This 4 year certificate permitted only for the last
6 months of 1974 allowed thrifts to pay up to 100
basis points less than the weekly average of 4 year
Treasury notes.
Table 16
Deposit Activity of 2 Year Certificates for FSLIC Insured
Savings and Loan Associations - 1980
Monthly Average Deposit Balances
5yr Treasury Notes ($ Millions)
Change in Percent of Total
Deposit Balances Deposit Balances
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank News March
Federal Home Loan Bank Journal March 1981
Month
10.74%
12.60
13.47
11.84
9.95
9.21
9.53
10.84
11.62
11.86
12.83
13.25
3,380
5,240
7,643
14,050
21,430
26,270
33,350
35,940
41,115
46,690
48,150
49,840
3,380
1,860
2,403
6,407
7,380
4,840
7,080
2,590
5,175
5,575
1,460
1,690
0.7
1.1
1.6
3.0
4.5
5.5
7.0
7.5
8.4
9.5
9.8
9.9
co
H
1981
Table 17
Deposit Activity of "Other Certificate" Accounts for FSLIC
Insured Savings and Loan Associations - 1980
Monthly Average
5yr Treasury Notes
Deposit Balances
($ Millions)
Change in
Deposit Balances
Percentage of Total
Deposit Balances
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
10.74
12.60
13.47
11.84
9.95
9.21
9.53
10.84
11.62
11.86
12.83
13.25
197,085
171,812
158,885
146,330
143,011
141,251
136,627
134,446
133,531
129,124
126,888
123,803
( 7,237)
(12 ,927)
(12,555)
( 3,319)
( 1,760)
( 4,624)
( 2,181)
915)
( 4,407)
( 2,236)
( 3,085)
38.7
37.0
33.9
31.2
30.3
29.6
28.5
27.9
27.4
26.3
25.7
24.7
Note: "Other Certificate" includes all certificate accounts except the 6 month
money market certificate, 2 year variable rate certificate and $100,000
minimum jumbo certificates.
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank News March 1981
Federal Home Loan Bank Journal March 1981
Month
K)i
ecember
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ceiling on all certificates issued after March 1980.
During November and December 1980 when market rates were
well above the 12 percent rate ceiling, (5 year Treasury
Notes average monthly yield was 12.83 percent in
November and 13.25 percent in December) deposit growth
in 2 year certificates were relatively flat. Balances of
two and a half year certificates increased by only
$1,460 million in November and $1,690 million in
December, the smallest growth in monthly deposits since
these certificates were first introduced.
Even if initially successful in attracting consumer
deposits dollars into longer maturity accounts, these
variable rate certificates are likely to have the same
problems as the other certificate accounts in retaining
the depositor's principal unitl maturity should market
interest rates move sufficiently above the contracted
rate during the certificate term. With a withdrawal
penalty of only 6 months interest even a moderate
rise in interest rates will make it economic for the
certificate holder to redeem the principal, pay the
early redemption fee, and reinvest the proceeds in
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new investment vehicles yielding market rates.36 Thus
the long term certificate account, although providing
the Savings and Loan industry with a more stable and
predictable source of funds than other short maturity
deposit accounts, still because of their moderate
redemption features exhibits many of the volatile
characteristics of these short maturity accounts.
The only major deposit account currently available
to the Savings and Loan industry, that offers
opportunities to lengthen the maturity of their deposit
structure is the $100,000 minimum jumbo certificate
account.37 These accounts, unregulated by the government
as to rate, maturity or redemption provisions, offer
thrifts the flexibility to market the type of jumbo
3 6Here is an example. Suppose I buy a $10,000 2 year
certificate with an effective annual yield of 10 percent.
At maturity, 2 years later, I would receive $12,690.
If, however, after say 6 months, yields on 2 year Treasury
securities rise to 12.66 percent or above, I would earn
more than the $12,690 at maturity by redeeming the
certificate, paying the 6 month interest penalty and
investing the $10,000 principal in these 2 year
Treasury securities.
3 7 Other accounts Savings and Loans can offer that have
larger maturities than most other deposit accounts are
Negotiated Order of Withdrawal (N.O.W.) accounts
discussed later in this paper and the specialized
Individual Retirement Account (I.R.A.) and Keogh
deposits. Current government restrictions on use of
these latter accounts and imposed rate ceilings of 8
percent, limit growth possibilities for these type
accounts, and assure they will make up an insignificant
proportion of thrift deposits.
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account best suited to their needs and market conditions.
These accounts up to now have been largely ignored,
especially for their potential as long term sources of
funds, by all except the largest and most innovative
Savings and Loan Associations and are overwhelmingly
of short maturity.38 As of December 31, 1980, jumbo
certificates totalled $41.4 billion or 8.2 percent of
total saving deposits.
Borrowing Innovations
Concurrent with attempts to lengthen the maturity
of the Savings and Loan Industry's deposit structure,
regulators expanded Savings and Loan authority to
either borrow from the Federal Home Loan Banks on a
longer term basis or to issue long term securities on
a non-redeemable basis. In 1969, the regional Federal
Home Loan Banks changed their policies of only lending
to Savings and Loan's for short terms at variable rates
and began to offer members advances up to 10 years at
fixed rates. In 1973, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) improved the access of federally chartered
Savings and Loan's to capital markets by permitting
38Most of the Savings and Loans using these accounts
rely upon them near the top of the interest rate cycle
as a substitute for their short-term borrowing needs.
I will discuss two Savings and Loan Associations that have
actively used these CD type accounts in these and
other ways in a later chapter of this thesis.
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them to issue subordinated debentures (unsecured debt).
This was followed in 1975 by regulations permitting
Savings and Loans to issue mortgage backed bonds - debt
secured by a pool of mortgages from the S&L's asset
portfolio. Beginning January 1980, the nation's
federally chartered Savings and Loan Associations were
given even further access to these and other credit
market instruments (e.g. commercial paper) when the FHLBB
further liberalized its restrictions on Savings and Loan
Association borrowing. Where previous to the new rule,
federally chartered S&Ls were limited to borrowing
from within the FHLBB system up to an amount that could
not exceed 50 percent of the institution's savings
base, and from outside the FHLBB system, to an amount
which could not exceed 15 percent of the institution's
savings base, now they can all borrow from sources both
inside and outside the FHLBB system up to 50 percent
of their total assets. 3 9
The expanded authority granted to Savings and Loans
to issue these instruments gives them additional
opportunities to obtain new funds at intermediate and
long-term rates that are not affected by short-term
fluctuations in money market rates. The funds generated
3 9 Richard Marcis "Innovation and Reform in the Savings
and Loan Industry" AREUEA Journal Spring 1980.
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from these instruments are perfect for use in inter-
mediate - long term maturity assets such as mortgage
loans. By approximating the maturity of these
instruments, (5-10 years) with the maturity of the
new mortgages made, the spread between the yield of the
new mortgages and the cost of the debt can be effectively
locked in and made insensitive to interest rate changes.
Despite the importance of these longer term debt
instruments in reducing the interest rate risk associated
with long term mortgage lending, their use by the
nation's Savings and Loan industry has been extremely
limited over the years. This can be observed in Table
18, where borrowings from all FSLIC insured Savings
and Loan Associations as of year-end 1980 are compared
with borrowings outstanding as of year-end 1976.
Although borrowings from the Federal Home Loan banks
and from outside sources have increased substantially
over this period, (total borrowings increased from
$18.9 billion to $63.4 billion) much of that borrowing
is still not in long term sources of capital. By year-
end 1980, 49 percent of all Savings and Loan borrowings
mature within 1 year compared with only 35 percent of
total borrowings in year-end 1976. Of longer term
borrowing sources, mortgage backed bonds show the most
substantial percentage increase. Where in 1976
mortgage backed bonds issues outstanding totalled only
Table 18
Borrowings of FSLIC Insured Savings and Loan Associations
1976, 1980
December 1976 December 1980
Amount Amount
Outstanding Percent of Outstanding Percent of
($ Billions) Total Borrowings ($ Billions) Total Borrowings
FHLB Advances 15.7 83.1 46.6 73.0
Outside Borrowings 3.2 16.9 16.8 27.0
Mortgage Backed Bonds .1 .5 3.7 5.9
Subordinate Debt .1 .5 .2 0.03
Reverse Repurchase 1.8 9.5 8.5 13.4 Co
Other 1.2 6.3 2.4 3.8
Total Borrowings 18.9 100.0 63.4 100.0&
Memorandum:
Short Term Borrowings1  6.7 35.4 30.8 48.6
FHLBB Advances 4.2 22.2 19.0 30.0
Outside Borrowings 2.5 13.2 11.8 18.6
1 Short Term Borrowings defined as being due in less than one year.
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Statement of Condition4 Semi-Annual
Aggregates, December 31, 1976 and December 31, 1980.
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$10 million by year-end 1980, MBB issues outstanding
increased to $3.7 billion. Still despite these
increasesmortgage backed bonds account for only 5.9
percent of total Savings and Loan borrowings and for less
than 1 percent of total assets in 1980, (this is
substantially below the legal maximum of 25 percent of
total assets for collateralized borrowings).
One reason for the limited use of mortgage backed
bonds and other credit market instruments by the nation's
Savings and Loan Associations can be seen in Table 19
where the borrowings for all FSLIC insured Savings and
Loan Associations are broken down by Association size.
Of all mortgage backed bond issues outstanding in
December 1979j 88 percent were made by Savings and Loans
with assets over $1 billion. For this group representing
30 percent of all Savings and Loan Associations,
mortgage backed bonds were the second largest source of
borrowed funds next to Federal Home Loan Bank advances;
they accounted for 13 percent of total borrowings or
2 percent of total assets in December 1979.
Of all mortgage backed bonds issues outstanding in
December 1979, 11 percent were made by Savings and Loan
Associations with between $500-$999 million in assets
and only 1 percent or .1 billion were made by Savings
and Loans with assets below $500 million. For these
Table 19
Borrowings by Asset Size of FSLIC - Insured Savings and Loan Associations
December 1979
Savings and Loans with Assets of:
Less than $100 $100 Million to $500 Million to $1 Billion or
Percent of Million $499 Million $999 Million More
all Operating
Savings and 20.5 35.7 13.6 30.1
Loans
Out- % of Total Out- % of Total Out- % of Total Out- % of
standing Borrowings standing Borrowings standing Borrowings standing Total
($Billions) ($Billions) ($Billions) ($Billions) Borrow-
Item ings
FHLIB Advances 4.9 83.0 13.9 80.3 7.0 79.5 14.3 63.0
Outside Borrow-
ings 3.4 19.7 1.8 20.5 8.4 37.0
Mortgage-backed
Bonds * .1 0.6 .2 2.3 3.0 13.2
Subordinate debt * * .1 0.4
Reverse Re-
purchases .4 6.8 2.1 12.1 1.1 12.5 2.7 11.9
Other .6 10.2 1.2 6.9 .5 5.7 2.6 11.5
Total Borrowings 5.9 100.0 17.3 100.0 8.8 100.0 22.7 100.0
Memorandum:
Short-Term
Borrowings 3.2 54.2 8.7 50.3 4.0 45.5 9.4 41.4
FHLBB Advances 2.3 40.0 5.7 32.9 2.5 28.4 4.4 19.4
Outside Borrow-
ings .9 14.2 3.0 17.3 1.5 17.0 5.0 22.0
Note: *Less than 50 million
I'
Source: Department of Treasury, The Report of the Interagency Task Force on Thrift
Institutions, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 145,
Table 2.
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smaller associations with assets below $500 million,
representing over 50 percent of all Savings and Loans,
the size requirements for sale of these and other credit
market instruments is too large for their credit needs.40
These institutions, too small to access credit markets
directly, must rely heavily upon Federal Home Loan Bank
advances as a source of long term (as well as short term)
funds. More than 80 percent of total borrowings, and
more than 90 percent of longer-term borrowings, were
obtained from FHLB advances for these smaller associations
with under $500 million in assets, compared to only 63
percent of total borrowings, and 75 percent of longer
term borrowings, for associations with over $1 billion
in assets.
Another explanation for the limited use of longer
term debt instruments by even large Savings and Loan
Associations, has to do with their relative attractiveness
at different phases of the credit cycle. The best time
to issue these securities is during periods where
interest rates are generally stable or declining and
the term structure is positively sloped. It is at these
times, however, that Savings and Loans have traditionally
4 0According to one author, even a small issue of $10
million is possible for at most the 500 largest of the
4200 Savings and Loan Associations. William Bradford,
"Mortgage Backed Bonds for Savings and Loan Associations:
Management and Public Policy Issues," in New Sources of
Capital for the Savings and Loan Industry (Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco 1979).
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been flooded with short-term deposits that have been
usually used for long term mortgage lending. Longer term
debt instruments have been used only by the most forward
looking innovative institutions, those institutions that
are wary of using seemingly plentiful low cost deposit
funds to make long term mortgage loans, and who would
rather depend on (initially) higher cost but stable
long term funds to lock in a spread that won't be
jeopardized by higher interest rates.
Use of these longer term debt instruments falls
off rapidly however, when interest rates rise, the term
structure becomes inverted and short term rates exceed
long term rates. At these times, Savings and Loans find
it difficult to find investors interest in purchasing
long term securities and find it difficult to find
sufficient mortgage lending opportunities needed to
justify a bond issues expense. In 1980 for instance,
a period of widely fluctuating short term rates, and
rapidly escalating long term rates, issues of mortgage
backed bonds increased by the smallest amount since they
were first allowed to be offered in 1975. (Table 20)
While yearly increases in mortgages backed bonds averaged
1.07 billion for years 1976-1979, mortgage backed bonds
issues increased by only .353 billion in 1980.
Alternative Mortgage Instruments
The difficulties shared by all Savings and Loan
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Table 20
Mortgage Backed Bond Issues by
FSLIC Savings and Loan Associations
1976 - 1980
Amount
Outstanding
$ Millions
Amount
Increase
$ Millions
Percentage
Increase
140
1,295
1,961
3,379
3,733
1,155
666
1,419
353
825
51
72
10
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Statement
of Condition Semi-Annual Aggreqates,
December 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980.
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
94
Associations in finding stable sources of funds with
yield and maturity characteristics that match the
standard fixed rate mortgage has led regulators to
experiment with new mortgage instruments that more
closely match the volatility in costs of Savings and
Loan liabilities. The variable rate mortgage (VRM)
first authorized in July 1979, and the renegotiable
rate mortgage (RRM) first authorized in April 1980,
for federally chartered Savings and Loan Associations,
are examples of the two alternative mortgage instruments
designed to reduce lender exposure to interest rate risk,
that Savings and Loans are currently permitted to offer.4
For both these instruments, the rate charged on the
mortgage does not remain fixed over the mortgage term
but instead is subject to periodic adjustments based on
changes in a standard public index of interest rates. 4 2
These adjustments, however, are restricted in their size
both from adjustment period to adjustment period and over
4 1As of May 1, 1981, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has
given the nation's federally chartered Savings and Loan
Associations new authority to issue alternative mortgage
instruments that match more than ever before the
volatility of their cost of funds. We will discuss these
new instruments later in this chapter.
4 2For the variable rate mortgage, this index is the U.S.
S&L cost of funds index. For the RRM an index of changes
in the U.S. mortgage rate is used. Both indexes are
published in the Federal Home Loan Bank Journal.
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the term of the loan. Thus for both mortgages the
lender is provided with only limited protection from
interest rate changes.
A comparison of these two instruments and their
differences is provided in Table 21. The variable
rate mortgage offers the borrower more protection than
the renegotiable rate mortgage. Patterned after the
California variable rate mortgage offered in that state
since 1975, it allows for interest rate adjustments
ranging from .1 percent to .5 percent every year with
a maximum adjustment of 2.5 percent over the mortgage
term. In addition, at the time of any rate adjustment
increase, the borrower has the right to request the
loan maturity be extended up to a maximum of one-third
the original loan term so that monthly payments can
remain fixed for a longer period of time. Furthermore,
any Savings and Loan offering the variable rate mortgage
must also offer any prospective borrower a standard
fixed-rate mortgage as well and tender side-by-side
comparisons of monthly payment schedules using both
instruments. These payment schedules must also include
a worst case scenario for the variable rate mortgage
involving maximum interest rate adjustments over a 10
year period. There is also a portfolio limitation
imposed upon S&L's offering the VRM. In any one year
not more than 50 percent of any association's home
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Table 21
Comparison of VRM and RRM Regulations
I tem
Index for rate
adjustments
Frequency of
adjustment
Maximum rate
changes
Mandatory rate
changes
Requirements that
customer be given
choice of SFPM
Portfolio
Limitation
Minimum rate
adjustment
Maturity extension
option of borrower
Notification
period
Prepayment penalty
Notification
requirements
VRM Regulations
(July 1, 1979)_
U.S. S&L cost
of funds or other
approved index
One a year or
longer
.5%/year 2.5%
overall
Decreases mandatory,
increases optional
Yes
50%
.1%
Up to one-third
original loan term
90 days
None within 120 days
of notification
(a) current & new
rates
(b) old & new index
rates
(c) accumulated but
unused rate
changes
(d) current monthly
payment and re-
maining maturity
(e) borrower's option
to extend maturity
or prepay
RRM Regulations
(April 3, 1980;
U.S. Mortgage
rate index
3 to 5.years
.5%/year 5%
overall
Decreases man-
datory, increases
optional. Also,
contract can
specify narrower
limits on
changes.
No
None
None
None
90 days
None after first
notification
(a) new interest
rate (with
Truth-in-
Lending
statement)
(b) new monthly
payment
(c) notice of no
penalty for
prepayment
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Item
Disclosure
Requirements
Costs at rate
adjustment
Adjustment of
other terms
Ballon Payments
Table 21 continued
VRM Regulations
(July 1, 1979)_
(f) way decreases
will be
applied
Side-by-side comp-
arison of a VRM
and a SFPM, inclu-
ding worst case.
Show 10 years of
cost-of-funds index,
and other inform-
ation on index.
Borrowers options
upon rate increases.
None
Just maturity
None
RRM Regulations
(April 3, 1980)
Need not offer
SFPM; also show
highest and
lowest rate to
be paid. Use
an example prior
to payment of
fees by
borrower.
None
None
None
Source: Henry J. Cassidy, "Comparison and Analysis of
the Consumer Safeguards of Variable Rate and
Renegotiable Rate Mortgage Instruments,"
Research Working Paper No. 95, Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, April 11, 1980.
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mortgages may be in variable rate mortgages.
The renegotiable rate mortgage, on the other hand,
designed in part to avoid many of the consumer safe-
guards characteristic of the VRM, also gives the lender
more flexibility in adjusting rates. In the re-
negotiable rate mortgage, the mortgage rate remains
fixed for a minimum of 3 years and a maximum of 5 years,
(as constrasted with the national VRM where the rate
can change once a year). The rate can then be adjusted
a maximum of .5 percent per year with a maximum rate
adjustment of 5 percent over the mortgage term. (This
is double the VRM permitted change.) For the RRM, there
are no minimum adjustment levels, no extending of the
loan maturity to handle increases in payment levels, no
portfolio restrictions as to the amount of RRM's an
association can make or hold, and there is no requirement
of having to offer a fixed rate mortgage alternative
to all borrowers offered an RRM.
The development of the renegotiable rate mortgage
in early 1980 was a response to the sluggish use of the
variable rate mortgage by the nation's S&L's and the
VRM's relative ineffectiveness in offsetting increases
in Savings and Loan deposits costs. Although once
very popular among large state chartered California
Savings and Loan Associations, accounting for between
60 to 80 percent of all new loans originations in the
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years 1975-1977, VRM use has declined significantly
since then, accounting for between 40-50 percent of
loan originations in the years 1978-1980. 4
This reduction in the use of the VRM among
California's large Savings and Loans corresponds to a
reduction in the rate discount offered to prospective
borrowers for use of this instrument. After experiencing
the enormous volatility in interest rates and increases
in deposit costs characteristic of 1979-1980, VRM
lenders have discovered that VRM rate adjustments lag
well behind increases in S&L deposit costs, making the
VRM instrument almost as poor as the standard fixed-
rate mortgage instrument for holding in an S&L's
asset portfolio.
In 1979, the average cost of funds of Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco members, the index used to
make California VRM rate adjustments, rose 115 basis
points from 6.97 percent to 8.12 percent, and in 1980,
this same index rose 147 basis points to 9.59 percent.
Even maximum upward adjustments in existing VRM's of
50 basis points per year did not even come close to
offsetting these deposit cost increases. In fact, the
258 basis point increase in deposit costs experienced
4 3William C. Melton and Diane L. Heidt, "Variable Rate
Mortgages," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly
Review, Summer 1979, pp. 23-31.
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by California Savings and Loans over this 2 year period
exceeded even the 250 basis point maximum adjustment
allowed for VRM's over the whole mortgage term. (It
would take California Institutions five years of 50
basis point per year adjustments to reach this 250 basis
point level and still it would not be sufficient to
offset increases in deposit costs realized in the first
two years.)
Because of limitations in variable rate mortgage
interest rate adjustments even many large California
institutions that have more than 60 percent of their
loan portfolios in variable rate mortgages (there is no
portfolio restriction for California chartered S&Ls)
have not had performances any different from the industry
as a whole. Home Savings and Loan Association of
California for example, the nation's largest, suffered
a 55 percent earnings decline in 1980 despite having
58.7 percent of its loan portfolio consisting of variable
rate mortgages. Similar to most other Savings and Loans
across the country with only fixed rate mortgages in
their portfolio, Home was plagued by a loan portfolio
whose yield did not change rapidly enough to offset
increases in deposit costs caused by high interest rates.
While Home's deposit costs increased 16 percent from
8.67 percent in 1979 to 10.03 percent in 1980, their loan
portfolio yield increased by only 6.97 percent from
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9.67 percent to 10.34 percent, causing a 69 percent
reduction in their spread. 4 4
Because of the still large interest rate exposure
involved in holding VRM's, many Savings and Loans in
California have become interested in selling these
instruments in the secondary market; they have met with
little success. Institutional investors and federal
housing agencies remain reluctant to buy California
or other versions of the "variable rate mortgage" and
continue to prefer fixed rate mortgages instead.45
As a consequence of these and other problems with
the nationally authorized variable rate mortgage,
federally chartered Savings and Loans have been reluctant
to offer these instruments; and even for those that do
offer the VRM, they are unwilling to offer them at rates
sufficiently below fixed-rate mortgages to make prospective
borrowers interested in choosing them. Since June 1979,
44
H.F. Ahmanson and Company 1980 Annual Report, pg. 28.
45
Problems with acceptance of the California VRM in
secondary markets include their differences from other
type VRM's, the existence of California usury laws on
out of state purchases, and the prohibition against
federally chartered S&L purchases of VRM's with different
terms than the FHLBB authorized one. See Melton and
Heidt, "Variable Rate Mortgages," page 30 for a
further explanation.
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when variable rate mortgages were first authorized for
federally chartered S&L's outside of California, there
has been little activity outside the state. Of the
$18.9 billion in variable rate mortgages held by all
FSLIC insured Savings and Loan Associations by December
31, 1980, only 4 percent or $.76 billion were held by
S&L's outside of California.46 Clearly the VRM with
its limited interest-rate flexibility and its excessive
consumer safeguards has been greeted with deaf ears
by the industry.
The renegotiable rate mortgage, with its greater
interest rate flexibility and fewer consumer safeguards
than the variable rate mortgage, has met with a more
popular response. Since first authorized in June 1980,
renegotiable rate mortgages balances totalled $5.2
billion and accounted for 16 percent of all 1-4 unit
mortgage loans made by the nation's Savings and Loans
in the second half of 1980. Moreover, there were some
institutions through the second half of 1980 who took
4 6Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Statement of Condition
for FSLIC Insured S&L's, December 31, 1980, and California
Savings and Loan League.
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full advantage of the lack of portfolio restrictions
pertaining to renegotiable rate mortgage use and only
offered these mortgages to prospective customers. 47
Although apparently more popular than the variable
rate mortgage as an alternative mortgage instrument,
the renegotiable rate mortgage is unlikely to solve
the industry's asset-liability mismatch problems.
First of all, its 3 to 5 year minimum adjustment term
is well beyond the adjustment period or maturity level
of most other Savings and Loan liabilities. To reduce
Savings and Loan interest rate exposure to a minimum,
renegotiable rate mortgages should be funded by
liabilities with 3-5 year maturities. This would
eliminate as a funding source nearly all Savings and
Loan deposit accounts that for the most part have
maturities less than one year.
Even for institutions able to fund the RRM with
deposits of 3-5 year maturities, they face problems.
First of all the index selected for the RRM, the FHLBB
U.S. mortgage rate index, may not move in line with
changes in the cost of funds used to finance the RRM.
4 7These institutions included Chicago Federal Savings,
Chicago, IL, Point Loma Savings and Loan, San Diego, CA,
South Bend Savings and Loan, South Bend, IN. See G.
Christian Hill "California S&L's Signal Impending
Demise of Fixed Rate, 30-year Home Mortgage," Wall Street
Journal, February 12, 1981.
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A more appropriate index would be one tied to the yields
on 3-5 U.S. Treasury securities or the average rate
paid by various thrifts on 3-5 year certificates. 4 8
Furthermore, even if the index were corrected,
matching 3-5 year liabilities with the RRM would still
involve considerable risk. With adjustments that cannot
exceed 50 basis points per year and 500 basis points over
the mortgage term, the renegotiable rate mortgage
provided Savings and Loans with only limited protection
against interest rate changes even if these mortgages
are funded with liabilities of the proper maturities.
In an economic environment where interest rates often
fluctuate more than 50 basis points a week, the interest
rate risk borne by Savings and Loan Associations making
renegotiable rate mortgages is still quite substantial.
Because of the failure of the renegotiable rate
mortgages and the variable rate mortgage to offest the
ever increasing volatility and market sensitivity of
Savings and Loan liabilities, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board as of May 1, 1981 has given all federally
chartered Savings and Loan Associations and Mutual
Savings Banks almost complete freedom in developing
4 8 Statement of Donald Lessard, in Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Government Operations on Renegotiable
Rate Mortgage Proposals of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980)
p. 13.
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their own mortgage instrument whose yield fluctuates
with market interest rates.49 According to the new
regulations, these institutions can now peg mortgage
interest rates to almost any public index of interest
rates and they can now raise or lower the mortgage
rate based on changes in this index without limit. The
regulations also permit these institutions to add accrued
interest payments to the loan principal instead of
increasing the monthly payment and they likewise can
stretch out the loan payments by extending the loan
term up to 40 years.
The enormous flexibility of these regulations permit
the nation's Savings and Loan industry to issue mortgage
instruments that can be funded by any Savings and Loan
liability, including short-term deposits without interest
rate risk. By indexing mortgage rates and rate adjustment
periods to the yields on 3 month, 6 month, or 1, 2, 3, 5,
or 8 year securities, the Savings and Loan will be
assured of earning a return on these mortgages commensurate
with changes in the cost of their liabilities.
Furthermore, the express permission granted to the
industry to offer instruments that can include negative
49
Richard Hudson "S&L's Allowed to Tie Mortgage Payments
to Market Interest Rates Under New Rule," Wall Street
Journal, April 24, 1981.
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amortization of principal, goes a long way toward
solving, what Franco Modigliani calls, the demand
effects of inflation, namely the capricious changes
in the initial level or adjusted level of mortgage
payments due to inflation swollen interest rates. 5 0
Negative amortization gives lenders the flexibility
of separating payment level changes from adjustment
rate changes. Therefore borrowers can be offered
mortgages, during periods of high inflation and high
interest rates,with payment factors used to calculate
the periodic payment,below the debiting rate used to
compute the interest on the outstanding balances. These
mortgages can also protect the borrower from violent
increases in interest rates by keeping payments fixed
or limiting their increases for a period of time.
Rather than increase the payments when interest rates
increase, the lender now has the option of keeping the
payments fixed, adding the additional interest to the
borrowers outstanding principal balance, and extending
the loan term, so that borrowers payments can remain
at a more moderate level in the future.
A version of a mortgage incorporating these features
5 0Franco Modigliani and Donald Lessard "Inflation and
the Housing Market," in New Mortgage Designs for Stable
Housing in an Inflationary Environment Conference
Series #14 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 1975.
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that are now permitted under the new regulations has
been issued successfully since October 1980, by state
chartered Wachovia National Bank in North Carolina.5 1
This 30 year mortgage provides for quarterly
interest rate adjustments based on changes in 90 day
Treasury Bill rates, yet keeps monthly payments constant
for 5 year periods.
The quarterly rate adjustments determine how the
constant monthly payments are divided between principal
and interest during the period. Should interest rates
rise in a quarter, the borrower will make the same
payment as before but more of that payment will go to
interest than otherwise. Conversely, should interest
rates fall in a quarter a larger portion of the monthly
payment would be applied to paying off the principal. 5 2
At the end of each 5 year period the monthly
payment is adjusted up or down by an amount necessary
to amortize the remaining principal over the loan term.
Since these payments can be adjusted by at most 25
percent above (or below) the previous payment level, it
5 1According to Jerome Baron, thrift industry analyst for
Merril Lynch Pierce, Fenner Smith, as of year end 1980
all lenders in North Carolina permitted to offer this
mortgage have been doing so.
5 2 Given the nature of this mortgage, it is possible for
negative amortization to occur. Should interest rates
rise so substantially that the monthly payment is in-
sufficient to cover all interest charges on the principal
outstanding, the unpaid interest would be added to the
original balance.
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is possible should interest rates rise high enough
that the outstanding principal balance will not be paid
off by the end of the mortgage term. If such a situation
develops the lender has the opportunity to raise the
monthly payment for the final 5 year period of the loan
to whatever payment level is necessary for the borrower
to payoff the remaining balance. If these final
monthly payment increases are too large for the borrower
to handle, they have the option of refinancing the
balance at Wachovia or any other lending institution
over a longer period. (This is similar to extending
the loan term.)
This "Wachovia mortgage," now permitted for issue
by all federally chartered Savings and Loans, is the
best tested example of a mortgage instrument that provides
these institutions with the rate flexibility they so
desperately need without subjecting the borrower to
rapid and unexpected increases in mortgage payments. For
the Savings and Loan making these mortgages, no longer
must they worry about substantial erosions of their
spread caused by rapid and unexpected increases in their
deposit costs. Quarterly rate adjustments without limits
based on changes in an index that best reflects the
marginal cost of Savings and Loan funding sources fully
protects the spread from interest rate changes. For
the borrowers accepting these mortgages, they are assured,
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in an instrument that offers them no long-run protection
against interest rate changes, of considerable protection
in the short-run. Assuming even the largest interest
rate increases, the borrowers monthly payments remain
fixed for 5 year periods and adjustments between periods
cannot exceed 25 percent of the previous level.
The biggest advantage of this mortgage to the
borrower, however, is likely to be the substantial
initial mortgage rate discount lenders will be prepared
to offer, to induce them to accept a Wachovia as opposed
to a fixed-rate mortgage. Wachovia currently offers
its adjustable rate mortgage at an initial rate 2 percent-
age points below its fixed-rate competitors. 5 3
Because of the tremendous advantage of the Wachovia
mortgage over other currently available mortgage
instruments in reducing lender interest rate risk and
dealing with the demand effects it is likely to become
the predominate mortgage issued by Savings and Loans in
the future. Already, armed with this new mortgage,
Wachovia has become the most aggressive residential
mortgage lender in North Carolina. By year end 1980,
it closed $35 million in adjustable rate mortgages and
53G. Christian Hill, "Buyers Adrift: How Floating Rates
on Mortgages Affect More Home Purchases," Wall Street
Journal, May 6, 1981 pg. 1.
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- 54it expects in 1981 to close another $75 million.
With the flexibility to offer mortgage instruments
whose rate fluctuates with their most volatile liability-
their deposits, and their expanded authority to issue
longer term liabilities (mainly in the form of mortgage
backed bonds), the Savings and Loan Industry finally
has the capability of originating and holding a wide
variety of mortgage instruments without subjecting
themselves to interest rate risk. For the first time in
their history the industry now has the flexibility to
issue mortgage assets that match the characteristics of
all the various liabilities they obtain.
Implementation of these innovations, however, are
likely to take some time and is not without their risks.
The new flexible rate mortgage is likely to meet
resistance from the borrower confused by its complexity
and perturbed by the additional risk involved. From
the lenders viewpoint, these mortgages involve greater
default risk than the standard fixed rate mortgage and
will require new lending criteria to minimize this risk.
Furthermore, these mortgages, because of their additional
default risks, and their unfamiliar features, may not
be readily accepted by secondary market investors for
some time.
5 4 Ibid, pg. 20.
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The use of mortgage backed bonds by the Savings
and Loan industry also involves additional risks. S&L's,
to minimize the interest rate risk of issuing these bonds
must assure themselves that they are able to lock in
a spread with the funds obtained. This may be difficult
during periods of widely fluctuating interest rates when
mortgage rates can change quickly. In addition, S&L's
depending upon the state of credit markets, may have
trouble placing these issues. Whether because of too
much supply of or too little demand for long term debt,
S&L's may not be able to place the issue at the price
necessary to make the issue of these bonds worthwhile.
Despite the risks involved in utilizing these new
innovations, they are minor compared to the risks involved
in traditional Savings and Loan operations. Both
mortgage backed bonds and flexible rate mortgage provide
the opportunity for the Savings and Loan Industry to
maintain its presence in the mortgage market without
substantial interest rate risk.
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CHAPTER V
PERFORMING NEW FUNCTIONS: OTHER WAYS FOR THE
SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY TO IMPROVE THEIR
COMPETITIVE POSITION AND BALANCE
THEIR ASSET-LIABILITY STRUCTURE
The success of two legislatively initiated reforms
has created opportunities for Savings and Loans to
balance their asset-liability structure and improve
their competitive position in other ways not previously
discussed. These opportunities require a movement away
from the traditional Savings and Loan business of
originating and holding mortgage loans; that is why
they are discussed in this chapter.
The development of a secondary market in mortgage
loans by a number of legislatively created agencies
(FNMA, GNMA and FHLMC) has created new opportunities
for Savings and Loans to continue to originate and
service fixed-rate mortgages without bearing the interest
rate risk of holding these loans in their portfolio.
To the extend that short term deposit funds can be used
for short term lending and fixed-rate mortgages can be
sold in the secondary market, Savings and Loan's can
improve the maturity imbalance between their assets and
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liabilities and thus reduce their interest rate risk
55
exposure.
The passage of the Depository Institutions
Deregualtion and Monetary Control Act in March of 1980
gives the nation's Savings and Loans opportunities to
compete in two new areas previously foreclosed to them.
The act, by giving S&L's the same powers as Commercial
Banks in both consumer banking and residential real
estate lending provides them with new arenas where they
can generate new business and practice sound asset-
liability techniques.
In this chapter we will look more closely at the
capability these legislative reforms provide the Savings
and Loans Industry to cope with the new financial
environment of the eighties.
Savings and Loans as Mortgage Bankers:
Opportunities Created by Development of a
Secondary Mortgage Market
The use of loan sales by the industry as a method of
reducing the risk of their asset portfolio and for
generating fee income has been limited. Until 1977
the nation's Savings and Loan Associations purchased
5 5 Risk exposure still exists in the period between
origination and net sale of the mortgage, while the
mortgage is held temporarily in inventory. Ways of
eliminating this risk exposure using the financial futures
market will be discussed later in this chapter.
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more mortgages than they sold, and although loan sales
have accounted for an increasing proporation of mortgage
originations, since 1977; they still accounted for only
22 percent of all mortgage loans made in 1980. (Table 22)
Although some of the blame for the limited use of
loan sales must fall on the institutions themselves, many
of whom are reluctant to undertake mortgage banking
type operations, much of the blame must also fall on
the secondary market, which up until recently has had
relatively little demand for Savings and Loan originated
mortgages.
The secondary mortgage market has achieved its
furthest development in Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) insured and Veterans Administration (VA) guaranteed
mortgage loans and not in conventional mortgage loans
Savings and Loans specialize in. (FHA and VA loans
accounted for only 11 percent of Savings and Loan
mortgage originations in 1980.) Prior to 1970, the only
secondary mortgage market activity was in government
guaranteed mortgages purchased by the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae). Although since 1970,
this agency has begun to purchase conventional mortgages
some of which are originated by Savings and Loan
Associations, the majority of purchases are still in
FHA-VA mortgage loans originated by mortgage bankers.
Table 22
Secondary Mortgage Market Activity by Savings and Loan Associations
1970 - 1980
Loans and Loans and Percent
Participations Participations Net Total Loans of Total
Year Purchased Sold Ppirchases Closed Loans Sold
1970 3,745 1,108 2,637 20,760 05
1971 7,529 2,165 5,364 38,341 06
1972 10,619 3,719 6,900 50,024 07
1973 7,229 3,457 3,772 48,193 07
1974 5,903 3,504 2,399 38,050 09
1975 8,544 5,206 3,338 53,799 10
1976 12,799 8,447 4,352 77,103 11
1977 14,497 13,846 651 105,287 13
1978 10,984 15,845 (4,861) 108,273 15
1979 12,012 18,311 (6,299) 98,730 19
1980 12,955 15,856 (2,901) 71,270 22
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal various issues.
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By year-end 1980, Fannie Mae held $57 billion purchased
mortgage loans in their asset portfolio, only of which
were in conventional mortgages.
The secondary market for FHA-VA mortgage was
greatly expanded by the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae) guaranteed mortgage backed
security program. In this program, Ginnie Mae guarantees
(for a fee) the timely payment of principal and interest
on securities, issued by an approved private mortgage
institution, and backed by pools of FHA insured or VA
guaranteed mortgages.56 These securities, which pass-
through to the security holders the monthly installments
of interest and principal of the underlying mortgages,
together with any prepayments of principal has been
widely accepted by the public. Their safety, (payments
are guaranteed by the full faith of the Federal
government) liquidity, (they are traded every day on
public security exchanges) and their high yields have
made these securities competitive with bonds in the
portfolios of investors.
The willingness and adeptness of mortgage bankers
5 6According to Ginnie Mae regulations: "Any qualified
FHA mortgage who is judged to have adequate experience
and facilities to issue mortgage backed securities who
is approved for a guarantee by GNMA can issue pass-
through securities." Dwight M. Jaffee, and Kenneth
Rosen, "The Use of Mortgage Passthrough Securities," in
New Sources of Capital for the Savings and Loan Industry
(Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco) 1979. pg. 131
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in pooling the mortgages they originate and issuing
these securities, (mortgage bankers account for 75
percent of all GNMA passthrough security issues) and
the warm reception of the public in accepting them has
led to an explosion of Ginnie Mae issued beginning in
the mid-seventies. From mortgages pools of less than
$500 million in 1970, the market for Ginnie Mae's
balloned to a mortgage pool of more than $93 billion
in 1980. (Table 23) Between Fannie Mae purchases and
Ginnie Mae securities over 90 percent of all newly
originated FHA-VA mortgages on single family homes make
their way to the secondary market, (over 3/4 of these
mortgages will end up in Ginnie Mae mortgage pools).57
Despite the surge in issues of Ginnie Mae mortgage
backed securities, Savings and Loan participation in
the program remains small relative to their size and
number. Although 78 percent of Savings and Loan FHA-VA
mortgage holdings were included in Ginnie Mae mortgage
pools, by year end 1980 they represented only 25 percent
.58
of total Ginnie Mae mortgage pools outstanding.
Because of the tremendous success of the Ginnie Mae
5 7 Charles M. Sivesind, "Mortgage Backed Securities: The
Revolution in Real Estate Finance," Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Autumn 1979 pg. 4.
5 8Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Statement of Condition for
FSLIC S&Ls, Semi-Annual Aggregates, December 31, 1980.
Table 23
Residential Mortgage - Backed Passthrough
Certificates Outstanding
(Dollars in Millions)
1970 
- 1980 Percent of
GNMA FHLMC FHMA Total Total Mortgage Debt
1970 347 -- 2,245 2,592 0.35
1971 3,074 64 3,693 6,831 0.99
1972 5,504 441 8,459 14,404 2.39
1973 7,890 766 9,384 18,040 2.64
1974 11,769 757 11,273 23,799 3.21
1975 18,257 1,598 14,283 34,138 4.26
1976 30,572 2,671 16,558 49,801 5.60
1977 44,896 6,610 18,783 70,289 6.87
1978 54,347 11,892 22,394 88,633 7.56
1979 76,401 15,180 27,697 119,278 8.94
1980 93,874 16,952 31,672 142,498 9.83
Source: Federal Reserve Bulletin various issues
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mortgage backed security program in developing a
secondary mortgage market in FHA-VA mortgage loans,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie
Mac), assigned to develop a secondary market in
conventional mortgages, developed their own mortgage
backed security. Between 1970-1973, Freddie Mac, a
wholly owned subsidiary of the Federal Home Loan Banks,
purchased conventional mortgages from Savings and Loan
Associations (80 percent of its total purchases) and
other financial institutions strictly for its own
portfolio. In 1974, however, the agency began to
purchase conventional mortgages with the intent of
passing them along to other investors through the sale
of mortgage participation certificates (PCs) or
guaranteed mortgages certificates (GMC).59 These
securities are very similar to Ginnie Mae's. They
represent ownership interests in pools of conventional
mortgages purchased by Freddie Mac. Freddie Mac
guarantees the monthly payments of interest and principal
on the underlying mortgages and either funnels these
59"To avoid the marketing problems that could arise with
securities backed by uninsured loans, Freddie Mac deals
in its mortgage pools only with conventional mortgages
that carry an original loan to value ratio of not more
than 80 percent or in the case of lower down-payment
loans, with mortgages that carry private insurance up to
the equivalent minimum equity ratio," Neil G. Berkman,
"Mortgage Finance and the Housing Cycle," New England
Economic Review September/October 1979 pg. 68.
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payments to investors semi-annually in the case of the
GMC or monthly in the case of the PC.
Although these Freddie Mac issues have been
marketed with great success, the size of the program is
much smaller than Ginnie Mae's. Freddie Mac mortgage
pools currently outstanding total $17 billion in 1980,
only 18 percent of the $93 billion in Ginnie Mae's out-
standing. Freddie Mac's secondary market effort in
conventional mortgages is especially small when compared
to the size of the primary conventional mortgage market.
In 1980, Freddie Mac purchased $3 billion in conventional
mortgages and sold $2.5 billion in mortgage participation
certificates. This represented only 8 percent of the
over $36.5 billion in conventional 1-4 family home
mortgages the Savings and Loan industry originated in
1980.60
Encouraged by the success of Freddie Mac in selling
mortgage passthrough securities a number of large Savings
and Loans, Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies, have
issued their own mortgage passthrough securities based
on pools of mortgages they originate. The issues
typically obtains mortgage insurance for the pool and
60Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal, February 1981.
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sells the securities through an underwriting group.
Through August 1979, 22 public offerings were made with
total outstandings of over $1 billion. The offering
size ranged from $25-100 million.61 More recently
even small originators are obtaining access to the
market. A number of conduit companies have been formed
who issue passthroughs backed by conventional mortgages
originated and serviced by 30-40 lenders. 6 2
The Dime Savings Bank, New York's second largest
Savings Bank is one institution fully exploiting the
opportunities created by privately issued mortgage
passthrough securities. During 1980, it issued two
$10 million passthroughs backed by single family
mortgages. The funds raised from these issues allowed
the Savings Bank to maintain a strong presence in the
mortgage market, while other New York Savings Banks
considerably reduced their mortgage lending operations.
Based on the success of these two issues, the Dime
intends to pool almost all the single family fixed-rate
6 1 See Jaffee and Rosen, "The Use of Mortgage Passthrough
Securities," page 134 for a further description of these
offerings.
6 2one example was a passthrough issued by Institutional
Securities Corporation a corporation wholly owned by
New York Savings Banks who compiled $25 million in pass-
throughs from numerous New York savings banks and sold
them to the N.Y.S. Employee Retirement System, Savings
Bank Journal February 1981, pg. 66.
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mortgages it originates and issue mortgage backed
passthrough securities. 63
Although the size of conventional mortgage backed
securities issued by the private sector is still small
(it totalled $3.7 billion by June 30, 1980) the potential
for growth is enormous. Currently Freddie Mac is
thinking of issuing its own corporate guarantees for
securities backed by pools of conventional mortgages
and Fannie Mae is now considering issuing its own
mortgage passthrough security in conventional mortgages. 6 4
Both innovations will greatly expand the secondary
market for conventional mortgages.
Although the growth of the secondary market in
conventional mortgages does provide new opportunities for
the Savings and Loan Industry to take on mortgage banking
operations, these operations are not without their
problems.
First, because it may take anywhere from three to
six months to accumulate a bundle of completed mortgage
loans for sale, a mortgage originator bears considerable
interest rate risk during the period they warehouse the
6 3 Leonard Sloane, "The Dime of New York Active as Lender
to Home Buyers," New York Times December 26, 1980.
6 4
"Freddie Mac May Bid to Guarantee Issues from Lenders
Backed by Mortgage Pools," Wall Street Journal March 17,
1981. Brooks Jackson, "Fannie Mae's New Head David
Maxwell Plans Aggressive Stance for Profits," Wall Street
Journal May 21, 1981.
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mortgages they originated. In an economic environment
where mortgage rates can change rapidly during this
period, mortgage originators can suffer large capital
losses when these warehoused mortgages are eventually
sold. Just such losses were registered by many mortgage
banking firms in 1980. For instancelTransamerica
Mortgage, one of the largest mortgage banking firms in
the country lost more than $1 million on the loans it
originated and sold in 1980.65
Many sophisticated mortgage bankers, however, have
eliminated their interest rate risk exposure during the
period they warehouse the mortgages by hedging in the
financial futures market. There lenders by selling
Ginnie Mae future contracts short can offset their
potential capital losses due to rising interest rates
by potential capital gains from the repurchase of these
contracts when rates rise. 66
Another problem that may hamper the development of
mortgage banking operations in fixed-rate mortgages is
the reduced demand for these type mortgages by many
secondary mortgage market investors. For the same reason
6 5 Laurel Sorenson, "Mortgage-Banking Shakeout is at Hand
as High rates, Inflation Buffet Industry," Wall Street
Journal October 21, 1980.
6 6For an example of hedging with Ginnie Mae futures see
Jerry Hartzog, "Controlling Profit Volatility," Federal
Home Loan Bank Board Journal February 1981, pg. 18-19.
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as S&L's many investors (especially those who depend
upon shorter term liabilities as a source of funds), are
wary of holding long-term fixed-rate mortgages in their
portfolios in an economic period marked by widely
fluctuating interest rates, and economic uncertainty.
Fannie Mae for instance, the nation's largest single
purchaser of mortgage contracts, has been hit by a
severe earning squeeze in 1980 caused by lagging yields
on their mortgage portfolio relative to their deposit
costs. 6 7
Thus in times of great economic uncertainty (like
1980) Savings and Loans engaged in mortgage banking
activities may experience a reduced demand for the
fixed-rate mortgages they originate. During volatible
months in 1980, to assure themselves of saleable assets,
Savings and Loans and mortgage bankers focused their
originations on short maturity equity loans which could
then be readily sold in the secondary market. 6 8
6 7 During the 3rd quarter of 1980, Fannie Mae reported its
first quarterly loss in 12 years. See Karen N. Arenson,
"Fannie Mae's New Challenge: Steps to Cope with High
Interest," New York Times October 28, 1980.
68G. Christian Hill, "Lenders Pushing Second Mortgages to
Ease Pinch of Long-Term Loans," Wall Street Journal
November 4, 1980.
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Savings and Loans as Family Finance Centers
or Wholesale Real Estate Lending Centers:
Opportunities Created by the Depository
Institutions Deregulation Act
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 offers the nation's federally
chartered Savings and Loan Associations sweeping new
asset and liability powers in exchange for a gradual
phase out of deposit rate ceilings. According to the
provisions of the act, interest rate controls are to be
phased out over a 6 year period (by 1986) in accordance
with the procedures determined by the Deregulation
Committee.69 After this 6 year adjustment period all
financial institutions will be able to freely bid for
funds and design depository instruments they best see fit
to attract the household deposit dollar.
The act has freed many of the restrictions on Savings
6 9This Deregulation Committee consisting of the heads of
the five major regulatory bodies governing financial
institutions, the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Credit Union
Administration Board and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, have not yet set a definitive deregulation
schedule. The latest schedule issued March 27, 1981
proposed lifting rate ceilings under the following time-
table: Accounts with maturities of 5 years or more, July
1, 1981; Accounts maturing in 2 to 4 years, July 1, 1983;
Accounts maturing in 1 to 2 years July 1, 1985; All
ceilings would be eliminated April 1, 1986. Wall Street
Journal March 27, 1981 pg. 18.
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and Loan activities that have created their familiar
structure as savings institutions specializing exclusively
in home mortgage finance. Congress's main concern in
broadening Savings and Loan powers was that these
institutions should not be at a competitive disadvantage
vis a vis other financial institutions (mainly commercial
banks) in carving out a niche for themselves in a world
without interest rate controls or the differential.
Specifically, the act gives federally chartered Savings
and Loans the same power as Commercial Banks in two
spheres. The first sphere is consumer banking. The
act gives Savings and Loans the authorization to provide
the consumer with complete banking services. No longer
must a Savings and Loan depositor go to a Commercial Bank
to open a checking account, apply for a personal loan
or line of credit, or receive trust services. As of
December 31, 1980, federally chartered Savings and Loans
nationwide have been authorized to provide N.O.W. accounts,
(interest bearing checking accounts) they can make
consumer loans; (up to 20 percent of their assets), and
they can issue credit cards and provide trust services.
The second sphere where Savings and Loans have been
given parity to national banks is in residential real
estate lending. The act gives Savings and Loans the
authorization to expand their home mortgage lending
activities into other real estate related areas. They
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now have expanded authority to make commercial real
estate loans and construction loans. They are no longer
restricted in the size of their mortgage loans or where
they make them. And they are now permitted to make
second mortgages.
By giving Savings and Loan's similar powers as
Commercial Banks in these two spheres, the act has given
these institutions opportunities to develop new
competitive strategies. No longer will Savings and Loans,
because of government restrictions be forced to operate
as "traditional S&L's". Instead, many will choose to
exercise all the consumer banking services now available
to them and become the "one stop family financial
centers" the act envisioned. Others might choose not
to develop the consumer services but instead exploit their
new real estate authority to the fullest and become
complete real estate lenders, catering as much to the
builder-developer as to the home mortgage purchaser.
Still others might choose to retain the traditional Savings
and Loan focus on home mortgage lending and use the new
powers more selectively. N.O.W. accounts and second
mortgage loans are the two new powers most likely to be
used by these traditional S&L's.
No matter what competitive strategy the S&L selects,
the tools provided by the act provide the S&L with
additional capability to balance their asset-liability
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mismatch. N.O.W. accounts, utilized by customers for
transactions rather than for savings, are less interest
rate sensitive, and more stable than deposit accounts.
Authority to invest up to 20 percent of S&L assets in
either corporate debt, commercial paper or consumer
loans provides S&L's with further opportunities to
offset short term volatile deposits with short term
assets. Furthermore, expanded real estate lending
powers, provide S&L's with new opportunities to invest
in interest rate responsive instruments. Construction
and commercial real estate loans are usually made at
floating rates and equity loans are of short maturity.
The problems the nation's federally chartered
Savings and Loans face in utilizing the new powers in
the act are the problems of entering any new business:
money and expertise. N.O.W. accounts have greater
operating costs than deposit accounts and require correct
pricing techniques: minimum balances, per check chargers
to become profitable. The new lending powers: consumer,
construction, commercial real estate, equity, loans are
fraught with risks unless lenders with the proper
expertise can be acquired or trained.
The evidence from the industry one year since the
act was passed, is that, except for N.O.W. accounts
and second mortgages most Savings and Loan's are not
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rushing into the new powers;70 they have chosen to retain
their traditional Savings and Loan focus. There are a
few Savings and Loans, however, that have entered these
new areas with zeal. "Home Federal Savings and Loan of
Tuscon Arizona has purged its top management ranks and
hired commercial bankers to run the company. It is
spending millions of dollars on new branch offices and
banking services, automatic teller machines and a
television advertising blitz telling consumers that Home
Federal "acts more like a bank every day"."7 1
State Savings and Loan of Los Angeles California,
on the other hand, intends to ignore the consumer powers
granted by the act and fully utilize the expanded real
estate powers. In 1980 they heavily invested in con-
struction loans, mortgage loans on large properties, and
home equity loans, all of which were greatly restricted
before passage of the act. 7 2
7 0As of mid-March 1981, 3400 out of the nation's 4400
Savings and Loans were offering N.O.W. accounts with
balances totalling $6 billion compared to Commercial Bank's
$35 billion. Dorin P. Levin "Rivals Helping S&L's Provide
N.O.W. Service," Wall Street Journal May 6, 1981.
7 1 other institutions intent on becoming consumer banks
include California Federal Savings and Loan, (the nation's
largest federally chartered S&L) and City Federal Savings
and Loan in Elizabeth New Jersey. Christian Hill, "S&L's
See Tough Times in Vying with Banks as Regulations Wane,"
Wall Street Journal December 11, 1980, pg. 1.
7 2The activities of State Savings and Loan will be
discussed further in the next chapter where it will be the
subject of a case study.
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These institutions now utilizing these new powers
are not doing so for the sole reason of balancing their
asset-liability structure. In a financial environment
marked by blurring distinctions among financial
institutions, and increasing competition in existing
markets, the Savings and Loan Industry must increasingly
make strategic choices designed to improve their
competitive position.73 Soon to be without interest
rate controls and the differential, the industry must
begin to devise competitive strategies needed to attract
consumer and institutional deposits. Furthermore, as
other institutions begin to enter the home mortgage
market (e.g. finance companies, commercial banks) due to
the attractiveness of the new mortgage instruments and the
need to lure the consumer deposit dollar, S&L's might want
to look for other profitable uses for the funds they
attract.74 For many S&L's around the country, these
competitive strategies might suggest a movement away from
the traditional Savings and Loan business.
7 3 For a recent discussion of this changing financial
environment see "America's New Financial Structure,"
Business Week November 17, 1980.
7 4 Citibank, for example, has heavily entered the home
mortgage market in an all out effort to attract the
consumer deposit dollar: Commercial Credit Company, a
finance company is also heavily entering the home mortgage
market converting its offices into homeowner centers. See
"A New Source of Mortgage Money" Business Week March 23,
1981.
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CHAPTER VI
THRIVING IN THE NEW FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT: A LOOK
AT TWO INNOVATIVE SAVINGS AND LOANS
The wealth of regulatory and legislative innovations
offered Savings and Loan Association's over the past 10
years gives them a dizzying array of tools from which
they can compete in the highly uncertain, more competitive
environment of the eighties.
In order to best describe how these tools can be
successfully combined and implemented, we will examine
the strategies of two California Savings and Loans whose
performance over the past 2 years set them apart from
other S&L's in California and across the nation.75
The unique performance of these two S&L's relative
to the competition is demonstrated in Table 24. Of
the 16 Savings and Loan stocks listed on the New York
Stock Exchange, only Financial Corporation of America
(FCA), holding company for State Savings and Loan and
Golden West Financial Corporation (GDW), holding company
75
It is unfortunate that the case studies described in the
text can only describe how the tools available through
1980 have been effectively utilized. With so many new
tools granted the industry in 1980-1981, S&L's are equipped
with a new arsenal with which to adapt to the financial
environment.
Table 24
Changes in Earnings per Share for those Savings and
Loan Associations listed on the New York Stock Exchange
1977 - 1980
NYSE Listed
Savings and Loan Associations 1977 1978
Gain
(Loss)
Gain
1979 (Loss)
Gain
1980 (Loss)
Ahmanson, H.F., CA
American S&L, FL
Biscayne FS&L, FL
Far West Financial Corp., CA
Fidelity Financial Corp., CA
Financial Corp. of America, CA
Financial Corp. of Santa
Barbara, CA
Financial Federation, CA
First Charter Financial Corp., CA
Gibraltar Financial Corp., CA
Golden West Financial, CA
Great Western Financial Corp., CA
Imperial Corp. of America, CA
Northern California S&L, CA
Trans Ohio Financial Corp., OH
*Contains extraordinary items
$4.55 $5.13 13% 5.11 0
2.57 3.84 49 5.76* 50
2,29 2.81 23 3.23 15
2.41* 4.03* 67 4.10 2
2.10 2.65 26 2.48 (6)
.91 1.39 53 2.02* 45
2.78 3.52 27 3.14 (18)
5.24 6.24* 19 5.34* (14)
3.27 3.55 9 3.05 (14)
1.98 2.24 13 2.12 ( 5)
1.29 1.63 26 1.74 7
3.30 4.01 22 4.15 3
4.10 4.96 21 5.24 6
3.36 3.65 9 3.40 ( 7)
3.25 4.10 26 3.43 (16)
Note: Naples Federal Savings and Loan converted to Stock ownership
was left out of this chart.
Source: Savings and Loan Investor, Vol. 10, No. 214 March 2, 1981.
in February 1980
(54)%
(48)
(77)
(59)
31
$2.34
2.98
.73
1.67
(.21)
2.64
.09
.70
1.32
(.57)
1.80
1.74
2.86
.71
.75*
WJt'j
(97)
(87)
(57)
3
(58)
(45)
(79)
(78)
1977 1978
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for World Savings and Loan, managed to increase their
earnings in 1980. Every other Savings and Loan listed
on the exchange had earning declines or losses during
this difficult financial period. These companies have
also been selected for study because their performance
has achieved using different competitive strategies.
Golden West has pursued its sophisticated asset-liability
techniques while retaining an essentially retail
orientation. FCA on the other hand, pursuing similar
asset-liability techniques has done so by backing away
from its retail business and emphasizing wholesale
functions.
Golden West Financial Corporation
Golden West Financial Corporation, is the nation's
fifth largest Savings and Loan holding company. It is
one of only three S&L holding companies permitted by
law to operate in more than one state. (It operates the
6th largest Savings and Loan in California, World
Savings and Loan, with assets of $4.9 billion; and the
6th largest Savings and Loan in Colorado also called
World Savings and Loan with assets of $651 million.)
Although acclaimed for its extensive and
architecturally renowned branch network, (it has the
nation's second largest S&L branch network many of which
have won architectural awards), Golden West is most noted
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for its consistent profitable performance in an inflation-
ary environment. Since 1966, Golden West has generated
56 quarters of earning increases compared to prior/year
results, a feat unmatched by any other Savings and Loan
Association in this traditionally volatile industry and
an impressive performance record by any industry
standards.
Golden West has accomplished these performance
feats by maintaining a prominent retail branch network
to attract deposits and disburse mortgages and by
sophisticated asset/liability management techniques to
assure these operations remain profitable. As described
in its 1979 Annual Report, the company views its
operations as that of a "retail store chain where
merchandise in the form of deposits or borrowings are
acquired, marked up, distributed and sold through branch
outlets." The company is determined to maintain this
"markup" and sees the "maintenance of a proper spread
as a function of liability and asset management." 7 6
Thus, unlike most other Savings and Loan who
continued throughout 1978-1980, to make long-term fixed
rate mortgage loans using an increasingly market rate
sensitive deposit base, Golden West recognized in an
environment of extreme interest rate volatility and
7 6 Golden West Financial Corporation, 1979 Annual Report
page 2.
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economic uncertainty this would be a sure path to
disaster. Instead, throughout the 1978-1980 period
management reduced its commitment toward long-term,
fixed-rate mortgage loans and emphasis was placed
instead upon building a highly rate sensitive asset
portfolio consisting of short term highly liquid CD's
and U.S. government securities. Mortgage originations
declined 30 percent from $862 million in 1978 to $599
million in 1979, and in 1980 mortgage originations
declined 75 percent further to $182.2 million.
Investments in cash and securities increased from
$394 million in 1978 to $687 million in 1979 and then
to $1,385 million in 1980. The restructuring of
Golden West's asset portfolio brought about by these
changes is demonstrated in Table 25. Where in 1977,
Golden West's mortgage portfolio accounted for 89.2
percent of total assets, this proportion was reduced to
72 percent in 1980. Similarily, the proportion of assets
in securities rose from 7.4 percent in 1977 to 24.8
percent in 1980.
Of the mortgages Golden West did make in 1979-1980,
7 7During periods of 1980, however, because of the
tremendous interest rate volatility, Golden West did at
times shift their investment portfolio to longer
term securities. This shift will be discussed later
in this chapter.
Table 25
Condensed Balance Sheet Data Golden West Financial Corporation
1977 - 1980
1980 % of 1979 % of 1978 % of 1977 % of
$Millions Total $Millions Total $Millions Total $Millions Total
Cash & In-
vestments 1,385 24.8 687 17.7 394 12.0 192 7.4
Loan Portfolio 4,017 72.0 3,050 78.4 2,780 84.6 2,305 89.2
Other Assets 177 3.2 152 3.9 114 3.4 86 3.4
5,579 100.0 3,889 100 3,285 100 2,583 100
Liabilities
Savings De-
posits 3,418 61.3 2,842 73.1 2,407 73.2 2,046 79.2
Passbook
Accounts 550 16.1 580 20.4 684 28.4 773 37.8
Money Market
Certificate 1,186 34.7 975 34.3 392 16.3 -- --
Other Certi-
ficate Accounts 868 25.4 955 33.6 1,222 50.8 1,213 59.3
Certificates of
Deposit 813 23.8 315 11.1 84 3.5 18 .9
All Other -- 17 .6 41 1.7 41 2.0
FHLB Advances 791 14.2 664 17.1 520 15.8 271 10.5
Other Borrowed
Money 1,056 18.9 120 3.1 132 4.0 69 2.7
Other Liabili-
ties 102 1.8 82 2.1 78 2.4 70 2.7
Shareholder's
Equity 212 3.8 181 4.6 151 4.6 127 4.9
5,579 100 3,889 100 3,288 100 2,583 100
Source: Golden West Financial
H4
Cu
Corporation Annual Report 1980
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the company tried its best to reduce their impact upon
the maturity of their asset portfolio. In 1979, it
relied heavily on the secondary market selling as many
fixed-rate mortgages to investors as it could. In 1980,
however, as volatile interest rates reduced demand for
fixed-rate loans, Golden West originated only short-term
mortgages with 3 year terms. (The company ignored the
VRM, convinced it lacked the rate responsiveness needed
to counterbalance their volatile deposit base.)
Changes in Golden West's liabilities in 1979-1980
were as dramatic as changes in their assets. Golden
West has traditionally relied on consumer savings for
increases in their source of funds. Because of aggressive
marketing of their accounts and their extensive branch
network, they have consistently posted larger gains in
consumer savings than the Savings and Loan industry in
California as a whole (Table 26). In 1979-1980,
however, as consumer deposit growth grew increasingly
sluggish, Golden West increasingly relied on $100,000
and over certificate accounts as a major source of funds.
These CD's, aggressively acquired from institutional
borrowers via competitive bidding, accounted for 53 per-
cent of Golden West's total savings gain in 1979, and 86
percent of their total savings gain in 1980. The
increasing use of CD's by Golden West can be seen in
the balance sheet (Table 25). From less than 1 percent
Table 26
Increases in Savings for Golden West and the California
Savings and Loan Industry
1976 - 1980
Consumer Savings
Increase (a)
Total Savings
Increase
Golden West California Golden West California
Percent Percent Percent Percent
1980 3.1 1.2 20.3 6.6
1979 8.8 4.1 18.1 12.4
1978 14.7 9.0 17.7 11.9
1977 17.7 15.6 17.9 17.2
1976 21.1 N/A 20.9 21.1
(a) Excludes certificates of deposit
Source: Golden West Financial Corporation Annual Report 1980
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of total deposits in 1977, certificates of deposit
increased to 11 percent of total deposits in 1979 and
24 percent of total deposits in 1980. As a consequence
of their heavy reliance of CD type accounts in 1979-1980,
Golden West did not suffer the disintermediation
characteristic of the industry as a whole. Where
deposits for all S&L's in California grew by only 6.6
percent in 1980, Golden West's deposits grew by 20.3
percent, the largest deposit growth experienced by
Golden West since 1976. (Table 26)
To increase even further its source of funds in
1980, the company relied heavily on short term borrowing
in the form of reverse repurchase agreements. Golden
West borrowed $992 million using this method in 1980,
compared to only $54 thousand in 1979. Between their
deposit and borrowing increases, Golden West was able
to increase its asset holdings by 43 percent in 1980 -
one of the largest growth rates in the industry.
In contrast to its reliance on short-term borrowings
during high rate periods of sluggish deposit growth,
Golden West, during more stable interest rate periods,
sought longer-term borrowings which were then used to
make mortgage loans. In 1977, the Company issued $50
million in mortgage backed bonds with 5 year maturities,
and in 1978, the Company relied heavily upon long-term,
fixed-rate advanced from the FHLB of San Francisco to
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fund their loan originations for that year.
The adaptability of Golden West to changes in the
financial environment and the sophistication of its
asset/liability management techniques was put to a severe
test in 1980 when interest rates advanced to historic
highs declined sharply and then rose precipitously to
new highs once more. With the sharp decline in short-
term rates in the spring of 1980, Golden West shifted
much of their asset base into longer-term securities
in the form of Ginnie Mae mortgage passthrough
certificates. (They purchased over $2 billion of these
securities.) These certificates provided Golden West with
the high yields of regular real estate loans and with
their high liquidity, provided Golden West with the
flexibility to restructure their asset portfolio once
more if appropriate. The high returns on these
acquired passthroughs enhanced the yield of Golden West's
asset portfolio, and the active management of these assets
throughout the second half of 1980 produced profits
totalling $23 million in 1980.
Golden West's ability to adjust its strategy to
changes in the financial operating climate was the
primary reason for its success. Unlike most other
Savings and Loans that continued to maintain the
traditional Savings and Loan functions of accepting
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deposits and making mortgage loans, Golden West was
unwilling to undertake these functions in a transformed
economic climate. Without the authorization to make
truly rate responsive mortgage loans, Golden West left
their home mortgage lending business and invested in
securities that provided the rate responsiveness they
needed to thrive; and, without the authorization to
provide competitive deposit instruments necessary to
attract the consumer deposit dollar, Golden West moved
to the institutional market where they could be fully
competitive in bidding for funds.
Golden West welcomes many of the new tools
provided by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Congress
which will help them once again re-enter their
traditional businesses. In its 1980 Annual Report,
Golden West urged for permission to issue a truly
adjustable rate mortgage that would offset the volatility
of their deposit base. With the new FHLBB mortgage
regulations, Golden West will be able to aggressively
enter the home mortgage market after a 3 year absence. 7 8
On the liability side, Golden West geared up in 1980
7 8Actually, Golden West, a state chartered California
and Colorado Savings and Loan cannot make these new FHLBB
approved mortgages until the respective states approve
their use. To expedite this, they have applied for a
federal charter which would immediately place them under
federal regulations.
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for the provision of N.O.W. account service in 1981.
This account, they feel broadens their product line
and makes them more competitive for the consumer deposit
dollar. They are, however, wary about rushing into
many of the other powers granted by the act which will
take them into areas beyond their expertise.
Financial Corporation of America
Financial Corporation of America (FCA), holding
company for State Savings and Loan Association
(California's 22nd largest Savings and Loan Association
with assets of $1.7 billion) has had a performance in
recent years unmatched by any other Savings and Loan in
the country. Ever since Charles Knapp, a former
investment banker took over management of the company
in 1975, the company's performance has markedly improved.
In spite of a financial environment in 1979 and 1980,
marked by economic turmoil, volatile interest and an
increasingly competitive environment for deposits these
years were by far the best years in the company's
history - with 1980 being even far better for the company
than 1979. While almost all other Savings and Loans
across the country had lagging deposit growth in 1979
and 1980 (national average 1979 = 9.06 percent, 1980 =
.44 percent) FCA's deposit growth accelerated (1979 =
31 percent, 1980 = 74.37 percent). While most other
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Savings and Loan's reduced their mortgage lending in
1979 and 1980 (national average 1979 = 8.9 percent,
1980 = -27.9 percent) FCA increased their mortgage
lending substantially (1979 = 36.2 percent, 1980 =
56.2 percent). And while most Savings and Loans had
reduced earnings or deficits in 1979 and 1980, FCA had
the largest earning increases in their history, (1979
= 34.3 percent, 1980 = 35.6 percent).79
FCA's incredible performance over the past few
years corresponds to the implementation of a corporate
plan that involved a massive restructuring of their
business. Unlike other Savings and Loans, it has
responded to the new financial environment by trans-
forming itself into a company that has moved far away
from traditional Savings and Loan functions.
The company considers itself as strictly an asset
management company specializing in the origination and
management of real estate loans. They do not consider
themselves as merely home mortgage lenders nor do they
consider themselves in the long-term investment
business.80 They now emphasize all types of real estate
loans, especially developer-construction loans, (these
79
Financial Corporation of America Annual Report 1980 and
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Journal February 1981.
8 0 Charles Knapp and J. Foster Fluetsch "Presentation
Before the New York Society of Security Analysts" January
15, 1981.
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loans made at floating rates account for 32 percent of
total loans outstanding) and every loan that is made
is packaged for sale. (Their plan is to keep turning
over their loan portfolio as quickly as possible.)
In addition, FCA no longer considers itself as
primarily a depository institution. Unable to provide
a competitive rate instrument to increasingly rate
sensitive consumers, they have reduced their emphasis
on the consumer deposit dollar and instead place major
emphasis on the merchandising of certificates of
deposit accounts to corporate customers. To raise
funds, the company relies primarily on its money
desk division, consisting of 10 executive salesmen who
contact government, corporate, and pension plan managers
for unregulated $100,000 plus deposits. These salesmen
who are awarded commissions based on deposit sales,
(they divided $400,000 in bonuses in 1980) brought in
$500 million in CD's in 1980, 90 percent of FCA's
savings gain. By December 31, 1980, certificates of
deposits accounted for 58.9 percent of FCA deposits.
In committing its funds, FCA does so with great
attention to reducing interest rate risk and locking in
spreads. As FCA chairman Knapp stated "Generally we've
first identified and adjusted to the lending market,
measured our needs and then raised funds with a
conscious effort to maintain a profitable spread and to
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the degree possible to match the maturities of both
deposits and loans." 8 1
In 1979, FCA was able, by making effective use of
the secondary market, to finance the bulk of its lending
in single family fixed-rate mortgage loans using short
maturity CD's, without bearing substantial interest
rate risk. They would lock in a spread by obtaining
commitments to sell the mortgages ahead of time, and
then make these mortgages with short maturity CD's.
In 1979, they sold $111 million in single family home
loans in this way, this represented 36 percent of all
single family mortgage loans.82
This method of locking in the spread was no
longer feasible in early 1980 as the demand for fixed-
rate mortgage by secondary-mortgage market investors
plummented. (They only sold $50 million in loans in
the secondary market in 1980.) No longer willing to
invest in fixed-rate mortgages under these new circum-
stances, FCA backed out of the home mortgage lending
market and aggressively entered the construction lending
business. Of the 725 million in real estate loans made
in 1980, 250 million were made in condominium conversion
8 1 Ibid.
82G. Christian Hill, "In an Ailing Industry State Savings
and Loan Keeps on Flying High," Wall Street Journal April
6, 1981 page 1.
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loans, single-family, owner-builder construction loans,
and construction or permanent loans on multi-family
dwellings. All of these loans were made at floating
rates equal to Bank of Amercia prime plus 2 points with
up front points varying from 2 to 4 points with rate
floors. Because the yield on these loans vary with
money costs, this strategy again locked in a spread.
During this summer as rates fell, FCA was again able
to enter the home mortgage lending market because it
was able to attract longer-term deposits. During this
rate window period that lasted two months, FCA's money
desk salesmen were able to replace over $200 million in
short-term funds with long term CD's (average maturity
of 3 years) which were then converted into single family
loans with an approximate 225 basis point spread. Taking
further advantage of this rate window, FCA obtained
$50 million in 5 year maturity Federal Home Loan Bank
advances which were reinvested in single family loans
with an approximate 300 basis point spread.
Throughout 1980, FCA also accelerated its second
mortgage lending program; they originated $70 million of
these loans compared to $25 million in 1979. These loans
with their short maturities and high rates sufficiently
offset the characteristics of their deposits and did not
expose them to additional interest rate risk.
Thus, due to FCA's sophisticated asset-liability
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management techniques, of the $725 million in real
estate loans made in 1980, 88 percent were locked in
either by floating rates or were matched in maturity to
large deposits. Only $90 million were subject to the
interest rate risk exposure of borrowing short and lending
long. Moreover the aggressive lending posture the
company took in 1980, (they increased their lending
by 60 percent) has provided them with the products to
sell into the secondary markets in 1981. Their loan
portfolio has one of the highest yields in the industry,
(the average yield on their earning asset was 13.36 per-
cent) with 50 percent of their new outstandings generated
at new rates and maturities.83
FCA has prospered in what has been for most Savings
and Loan Associations, the worst possible operating
environment. This has been accomplished by a careful
restructuring away from traditional Savings and Loan
modes of operation and toward operations bets suited to
the new financial environment. Recognizing their in-
ability, given current deposit regulations, to compete
effectively for the increasingly rate sensitive consumer
dollar, they thrust themselves into the institutional
market where they could be fully competitive. Now with
their money desk operations firmly in place, they are no
longer dependent upon variable consumer deposits as a
8 3
Knapp and Fleutsch page 10.
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major source of funds.
On the asset side, FCA recognized the danger of
lending long while depending on short-term market
sensitive deposits, and was quick to adapt their lending
operations to areas where a profitable spread could be
maintained. In 1980, that meant a diversification away
from home mortgages and into other real estate lending
areas that offered FCA the flexibility to issue loans
that best matched the characteristics of their funding
sources.
Having successfully adapted their operations to the
new financial environment, FCA looks forward for further
growth and prosperity. In 1981, they intend to open
money desk operations in San Francisco, New York and
Chicago to supplement their Los Angeles based operation.
These operations are expected to double last year's intake
of $500 million. The over $1 billion in CD's expected to
be acquired by FCA, will continue to be invested
primarily in floating rate loans to developers and the
homebuyer and by the end of the year the company expects
to have 50 percent of its outstanding loans floating
with the prime.84, 85
84G. Christian Hil, "In An Ailing Industry..."
With the passage of the new FHLBB regulations pertaining
to new mortgage instruments, FCA will no longer fear
making home mortgages using its short-term CD base. It is
likely to pursue both its developer business and its home
mortgage business with equal vigor.
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CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS OF THESE INNOVATIONS AND
REFORMS UPON THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY
AND HOUSING FINANCE
The case studies discussed in the previous chapter
provide important lessons of what is required of the
Savings and Loan Industry, if they are to effectively
compete and thrive in a financial environment where they
are unprotected by rate ceilings and where there is
tremendous economic uncertainty . Both FCA and Golden
West, by their innovative methods, managed to avoid the
disintermediation and profit squeezes characteristic
of the whole industry in the 1979-1981 period.
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the
examples set by these two S&Ls, is that the Savings and
Loan Industry must practice sophisticated asset-liability
management techniques, making sure they lock in a spread
by matching the maturity of the liabilities they obtain
with the assets they invest in. No longer can the
industry indiscriminately use their deposit base to make
long-term fixed-rate mortgages if they expect to survive
in this new economic and regulatory environment.
For Golden West Financial Corporation and Financial
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Corporation of America, operating under the regulatory
restrictions of 1979-1980, sound asset-liability
techniques prohibited their acting like traditional
Savings and Loans; they had to divert their funds away
from home mortgage loans to other assets that had yield
and maturity characteristics similar to their funding
sources. For Golden West, this was accomplished by
investing heavily in a portfolio of short-term securities.
For FCA, this was accomplished in 1979 by taking full
advantage of the strong demand for home mortgages in
the secondary market, and passing on the majority of
the mortgages they originated to those better able to
bear the risk of holding them. In 1980, as the demand
for home mortgages declined by secondary market investors,
FCA took full advantage of the expanded real estate
lending powers granted by the Deregulation Ac-t and
entered new real estate lending areas where they could
offer floating rate and short-maturity instruments that
matched the characteristics of their liabilities.
Another lesson demonstrated from the case studies
is that the Savings and Loan Industry must, if it is
to counter sluggish deposit growth, offer investors a
competitive rate on their savings. As Charles Knapp,
Chairman of FCA said, "there is no longer such things as
the small saver or below market rate sources of funds,
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there are only rate sensitive investors and competitive
rate sources of funds."86 Both FCA and Golden West,
unable to offer the small saver a deposit instrument
that paid a competitive rate, focussed their fund-
raising efforts on the institutional market where they
could aggressively bid for funds. Unhampered by regulatory
restrictions for $100,000 jumbo certificates, they were
able to offer a rate that appealed to investors and
which assured themselves of a continuous inflow of funds
that could again be used to lock in a spread and
generate income. While other S&L's, depending upon
consumer deposits as a major source of funds, lacked
new funds to invest and essentially went out of business
in high rate 1980, FCA and Golden West continued to
invest the surplus of funds they obtained in a high
rate investments that upgraded the yields of their asset
portfolios.
FCA went one step further in its investment strategy
than Golden West and therefore reaped greater profits.
By staying in the real estate lending business through-
out 1980, FCA was able to generate fee income in addition
to receiving high rates on assets whose acquisition did
not involve substantial interest rate risk. FCA, in
8 6 Knapp and Fleutsch p. 4.
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developing a wholesale real estate lending business on
the asset side, and pursuing the institutional market
on the liability side, has developed one prototypical
competitive strategy for success in the new financial
environment. By aggressively becoming a wholesale
institution, entering markets on both the asset and
liability side where they could effectively compete
and practice sound asset-liability management techniques,
they were able to achieve a performance that was the envy
of the industry.
FCA's competitive strategy, although highly
successful, is not transferable to the great majority of
the nation's Savings and Loans. The construction lending
business is highly competitive, involves considerable
default risk, and requires considerable expertise. For
most S&L's acting in the financia.l and regulatory
environment of 1978-1980, the only prudent tactic was to
do what Golden West did, rely heavily on certificates of
deposit and borrowings to supplement sluggish deposit
growth, get out of the home mortgage lending market,
and compile a highly rate responsive portfolio of
investment securities that would offset short-term
money market liabilities.
Any firm that ignored this strategy and continued
to maintain a strong presence in the home mortgage lending
market during this period, using short-term deposits or
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certificates of deposits as funding sources, is now
suffering losses. 8 7
Fortunately, however, with the development of new
reforms in 1980-1981, there are other strategies
available to Savings and Loan Associations, besides
those used by FCA and Golden West, to thrive in the
new financial environment.
Perhaps most important as far as most Savings and
Loans and the housing markets is concerned, is that
the Savings and Loan can now whole-heartedly enter their
traditional lending business - the home mortgage market
without having to subject themselves to enormous interest
rate risk. With the addition of a variety of flexible-
rate mortgages to the S&L repertoire of mortgage
instruments on May 1, 1981, no longer must an S&L
interested in balancing their asset-liability maturities,
divert a substantial portion of their short-term
8 7 Gibraltar Savings and Loan, the nation's 6th largest S&L,
aggressively used short-term certificates of deposit
($100,000 jumbo accounts) to maintain a strong presence
in the mortgage market in 1979 and early 1980, and took
a bath as short-term rates rose. In 1980 Gibraltar lost
$8 million compared to 1979 profits of $30 million.
See G. Christian Hill, "Strategy that Failed Seems
Likely to Alter S&L's Future Tactics," Wall Street Journal
May 16, 1980 and Gibraltar Financial Corporation 1980
Annual Report.
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liabilities out of the home mortgage lending market.
As discussed in Chapter 4 the new FHLBB mortgage
regulations permit Savings and Loans to issue mortgage
instruments that match, and therefore can be funded,
by any Savings and Loan liability. By indexing mortgage
rates and rate adjustment periods to the yields of their
most popular liabilities (e.g. 6 month MMC's) they will
be assured of a spread that will be maintained no
matter how much the cost of these liabilities used
to fund these assets change.
The flexible rate mortgage when combined with
the borrowing innovations discussed early in Chapter 4,
provide a method for S&L's to maintain a strong
mortgage lending posture even during high-interest
rate periods at the top of the credit cycle-periods of
traditionally diminished S&L mortgage lending. By
taking advantage of FHLB advances, credit market
debt instruments, or certificates of deposits, to offset
sluggish deposit growth, S&L's can provide a constant
supply of credit to the mortgage markets without worry
of interest rate risk.
Furthermore, to help spur mortgage demand during
these high-rate periods, S&L's now have the option to
utilize the negative amoritization features of the
adjustable rate mortgage, to reduce the borrower's monthly
payments, below what would normally be the fixed-rate
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mortgage's monthly payment, without reducing the rate
charged against the outstanding principal. Thus
borrowers who would normally be excluded from obtaining
a fixed-rate mortgage because of high rates and high
monthly payments, can now be offered a flexible rate
mortgage at a lower (depending upon the index) more
affordable monthly payment.
The traditional functions of the Savings and Loan
Industry can now be supplemented or superseded by other
functions, discussed in Chapter 5, that can help fill
S&L competitive or functional weaknesses.
For instance, the home mortgage lending capabilities
of the Savings and Loan Industry can be enhanced by the
utilization of mortgage banking operations. With the
development of a large secondary market in conventional
mortgages, the Savings and Loan Industry has increasing
opportunities to sell the mortgages they originate to
other investors. Mortgage sales provide the opportunity
for the Savings and Loan Industry to originate more
fixed-rate mortgages than they normally could safely
hold, which otherwise would be based on the amount of
long-term liabilities they were able to generate to fund
them. Mortgage banking also can provide Savings and Loans
with a tremendous credit resource in a financial
environment marked by increasing competition for funds.
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Moreover, the loan volume generated from this additional
fund inflow provides the S&L with increased mortgage
lending capability, and the fee income generated from
the additional loans made, improve their profit
performance.
Utilization of the consumer powers gained by the
Deregulation Act provide the industry with the capability
to increase their market share of the consumer deposit
dollar as well create additional demand for mortgage
and other new types of loans as well. By becoming
"one stop financial centers," S&L's can eliminate a
previous glaring weakness in their battle for consumer
deposits. Now with the capability of providing the
consumer with complete banking services, no longer will
commercial banks have a competitive advantage over
Savings and Loans. Utilization of these services are
likely to become even more important when deposits are
deregulated and the differential is eliminated. At
that time, commercial banks and S&L's will compete on a
level playing field (in terms of rate) for household funds.
In conclusion, the regulatory and legislative reforms
granted the industry over the past few years, provide them
with the capability to thrive in the new financial
environment. Now with the potential of the new flexible
rate mortgage, the use of mortgage backed bonds and other
innovations, and the use of the secondary mortage market,
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the Savings and Loan Industry will be able to maintain
their traditionally heavy commitment in the mortgage
market without the periodic profit squeezes or the
cyclicality in mortgage originations characteristic of
years past.
Furthermore, by making effective use of certificates
of deposits and the borrowing innovations discussed,
of the consumer powers granted by the act, and of the
secondary mortgage market, the industry will be able to
compensate for the disintermediation of consumer deposits,
which will persist until the industry is granted the
flexibility to offer consumers competitive deposit
instruments. It is this need for reliance on non-
consumer sources of funds for deposit growth that provides
one of the primary motivations for the mergers of smaller
S&L's into larger S&L's. There exist economies of scale
in accessing capital markets, pooling mortgages for sale,
and making the investments needed to become consumer banks.
Furthermore, the broadening of S&L powers in the
deregulation act provide the industry with the opportunity
to enter new profitable sectors of the financial
marketplace previously excluded to them. The Savings
and Loan Industry's composition will therefore, be much
more diverse than in the past; depending upon the choices
made by individual S&L seeking to adapt their skills to
the opportunities created by a competitive environment.
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Some like FCA, operating in areas of intense construction
and real estate development, might choose to enter the
developer-lending business. Other in rapidly growing
areas might want to emphasize mortgage banking functions.
And others, operating in mature residential areas might
want to develop a personal loan and credit card business.
Although the tools discussed give the Savings and
Loan industry the capability to deal effectively with
the future, they come too late to help them withstand
the solvency crisis being faced today. The industry now
and for the near future will remain severely crippled
by their low yielding mortgage portfolio as long as
interest rates remain above their mortgage portfolio
yields.
Until these low yielding mortgages are replaced by
assets that are higher yielding and which are financed
by liabilities of similar maturities, the industry will
continue to face the danger of insolvency. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the popularity of the market rate sensitive
money market certificate in 1978, and the 2 year
certificate in 1980, has made the industry more susceptible
to the dangers of maturity intermediation than at any
other time since interest rate controls were imposed in
1966. Thus, the industry's health, at least in the
short-term is entirely dependent upon the future pattern
of interest rates.
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Evidence cited in Chapter 3 indicates that if
current interest rate levels persist in 1981, the industry
will suffer its first aggregate loss in its history
(between $2-4 billion) and if they persist through 1985 -
the industry will have eaten through all its net worth
and will be insolvent.
The industry's solvency crisis may be even worsened
by the immediate demands made by an increasing rate
sensitive consumer. Right now even with the more
competitive rate deposit instruments they currently offer
the industry faces increasing difficulty attracting the
consumer deposit dollar. Lacking a deposit instrument
that is competitive with money market funds, the industry
is obtaining a smaller and smaller share of consumer
savings. Many smaller S&L's, restricted in their
ability to increase their non-deposit funding sources,
(their only source are FHLB advances) are unable to
generate sufficient fee income and higher loan yields
needed to offset the drag of their existing mortgage
portfolio.
The demand of the new financial environment will
force regulators to step-up rather than slow-down the
phasing out of deposit rate controls. Already, due to
the persisitence of rates above regulatory ceilings, the
FHLBB punched a bigger hole into the regulation Q frame-
work by giving the nation's federally chartered S&L's
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approval to offer a new account for the small
saver that is more competitive with money market funds.
This "investment account," offers savers with as little
as $1000 fixed yields for 90 days that are consistent
with short-term money-market rates.88 This account
which on the one hand will make S&L's more competitive
for the consumer deposit dollar will in turn exacerbate
their interest-rate risk exposure placing even a greater
share of S&L liabilities at competitive market rates.
As high interest rates persist through mid 1981,
more and more S&L's are coming face to face with in-
solvency as they are no longer able to pay competitive
deposit rates without some form of assistance. "In March
1981 alone, the FSLIC added 114 S&L's to its problem
list increasing the total of troubled thrifts to 246.
The agency concedes that 120 may be left with little or
no net worth by year-end and that another 100 could be
in the same fix in 1982. "89
The sheer numbers of S&L's requiring aid has swamped
the FSLIC and has severely tested its capability to
provide assistance. In 1980, the FSLIC laid out a record
"S&Ls Get Clearance on Plan to Compete with Money Funds"
Wall Street Journal May 12, 1981 pg. 20.
89G. Christian Hill, "Bill to Aid Sick S&L's Could
Eventually Lead to Interstate Banking" Wall Street Journal
May 21, 1981 pg. 1.
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$1.3 billion of its $6.3 billion reserve fund to acquire
the low-yielding mortgage assets of 31 insolvent thrifts,
which facilitated their merger with stronger associations.
(These outlays did not reduce the reserve fund because
of the $1.5 billion in premiums received from FSLIC
insured Associations during 1980.)90 In 1981, however,
with the number of insolvent thrifts tripling, the FSLIC
may have to change their tactics or may require out-
side support if they are to either keep the industry
on its feet or payoff insured depositors when S&L's
91
become insolvent.
The plan most likely to be implemented would
involve the infusion of enough capital into technically
insolvent thrifts to keep them going until either, rates
fall, merger partners can be found, or until their
9 0 G. Christian Hill, "FSLIC's Rescue Efforts Criticized
as Unsound use of Agency Capital," WJall Street Journal
December 28, 1980.
9 1 On May 14, 1981 the thrift regulators including FDIC
formally proposed a bill to Congress that would relieve
the strain on their funds. The plan includes 1) expanded
authority to lend money to troubled thrifts before
their collapse, 2) an increase in FSLIC's line of
credit from the U.S. Treasury from its present $750
million to $3 billion, and 3) permission to allow
FSLIC to bring in commercial banks, and other out-of-
state institutions as merger partners with thrifts.
G. Christian Hill, "Bill to Aid Sick S&Ls.".
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mortgage portfolios can turnover sufficiently to make
them immune from current high rates. The danger with
such a strategy, however, is if high rates persist, the
industry might require increasingly large amounts in
loans to pay competitive deposit rates and the payout
may ultimately prove larger than if insolvent S&L's
were just liquidated.
In the meantime, while Congress and regulatory
agencies consider possible solutions, the industry has
experienced a rash of conversions from mutual to stock
associations, and a wave of mergers, as the industry
searches for new sources of capital out of which to
pay competitive rates and support new services during
the transition period. In 1980 the number of mergers
in the industry exceeded the 100 level for the first
time since 1975 and was almost three times the 1979
figure (Table 27)
9 2 This plan advocated by the FHLBB involves the sale of
10 year "capital certificates" from the FSLIC to
associations with net worths below 2 percent of liabilities
and who experienced operating losses in the most recent
quarter. This certificate which are essentially loans
at 8.5 percent interest could be used to satisfy
government net worth requirements and could be repaid
from earnings when an association returns to profitability.
"Below Market Loans for Ailing S&L's Draws Support from
Bank Board Chief" Wall Street Journal April 18, 1981.
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Table 27
Mergers of the FHLB Member Associations
1960 - 1980
State
Chartered
13
18
30
42
36
72
80
70
38
48
50
52
31
27
26
20
39
Federally
Chartered
10
14
12
22
11
24
38
62
69
76
82
59
54
17
18
17
64
Source: Through 1979: U.S. League of Savings
Associations, Savings and Loan
Factbook '80.
1980: Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
TotalYear
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
23
32
42
64
47
96
118
132
107
124
132
111
85
44
44
37
103
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The number of voluntary mergers in 1981, should
interest rates persist at their high levels, will be
much higher. A poll of 100 S&L's by the National
Savings and Loan League in mid March 1981, found that more
than a third of those surveyed were considering
merging with another savings institution this year -
suggesting a potential for 1500 mergers in 1981.93
Although unlikely to be realized, the large number
of mergers now being considered by the industry is
indicative of what is likely to occur in the future.
In this high-rate environment, as the industry faces
stiffening competition from other financial institutions
who choose to compete in traditional S&L geographic and
functional areas, more and more S&L's will be acquired
by other financial institutions. In the future, these
mergers will no longer be merely among thrifts but
are likely to include financially healthy commercial
banks interested in expanding their products and markets.
Although the industry now possesses the tools to
remain competitive in the new financial environment; a
substantial number remain financially drained by this
environment today, making it difficult or impossible for
9 3 G. Christian Hill, "Regulators Seek to Ease Anxieties
Over Dismal State of S&L Industry" Wall Street Journal
March 20, 1981.
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them to pay competitive deposit rates and expend the
resources needed to innovate. Consequently, the industry
will continue to remain in turmoil until strong
financial institutions having the resources to pay
competitive rates, and the expertise to exploit
competitive niches, are formed.
By the end of the decade, when this period of
intense turmoil and transition is likely to
wane, the Savings and Loan industry will be very
different from the way it is today. The institutions
synthesized out of this transition period will be
larger, they will undertake a greater variety of
functions, and they will require more sophisticated
managers to run. In addition, these institutions will
be immune from an impending solvency crisis caused
by a mismatched financial structure and unexpected
interest-rate increases. Unlike their present counter-
parts, they will have fully met the challenge of their
asset-liability mismatch.
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